关键词: 演化博弈, 物流, 服务水平, 府际间合作

Abstract: A decrease in commercial land has brought some problems to enterprises, such as increasing inventory costs and slow supply. In order to alleviate the above problems, more and more companies are registering in developed areas or urban areas, while establishing off-site inventory in underdeveloped areas or non-urban areas. However, to some extent, the logistics industry transfer has led to the problem of imbalanced tax benefits between governments of two regions. Thus, in order to ensure the effective transfer or evacuation of logistics functions in enterprises, it is urgent to establish an effective incentive mechanism for horizontal intergovernmental cooperation.
To achieve the balance of interests between horizontal governments, we can adopt such restraint mechanisms as revenue sharing, risk sharing, and punishment to achieve a win-win cooperation. Based on the perspective of bounded rationality, we introduce the proportion of revenue sharing, establishes an evolutionary game model between developed and underdeveloped regional governments, and simulate the evolution process of horizontal intergovernmental cooperation strategies. Under the three mechanisms (no constraint, central government coordination and horizontal government self-restraint), we respectively analyze cooperation evolution strategies and profit sharing ratio between horizontal governments, study the promotion effect of different constraint mechanisms on horizontal intergovernmental cooperation, so as to promote horizontal intergovernmental cooperation and provide a certain decision support.
The research shows that two governments cannot obtain evolutionarily stable strategy without constraints. Under the constraints of the central government, the tax sharing ratio cannot be too high, otherwise local governments cannot cooperate. Compared with the government's self-regulation, the regulation scope of profit sharing proportion restriction under the constraints of the central government is high, and the regulation efficiency is low. The central government should strengthen its own policy confidence, increase supervision, punishment levels, and administrative intervention in local governments that do not share or improve. At the same time, the central government should also establish corresponding supervision systems, and eliminate the phenomenon of “free riding” among local governments. At last, the central government should establish a good constraint and incentive mechanism to scientifically guide the interest game between local governments.
Furthermore, we obtain some management implications: for local governments that cooperate for the first time, the central government should strengthen guidance, leverage the vertical political and administrative advantages between the central and local governments, and achieve coordinated regional development. For local governments with a foundation in cooperation and historical experience, it is necessary to leverage the economic advantages of horizontal cooperation between local governments, continuously explore new ways and methods of cooperation, improve cooperation efficiency, and coordinate the interests of local governments within the region to form an institutionalized multi-level cooperation organizational system. For governments that do not adopt profit sharing and local governments that do not improve logistics service levels, the punishment can be appropriately increased to encourage them to actively share and improve regional logistics service levels.

Key words: evolution game, logistics, service level, intergovernmental cooperation