关键词: 闭环供应链, 再制造, 专利保护, 专利授权, 权力结构

Abstract: With the scarcity of resources and environmental degradation, the call for resources recycling and green sustainable development in society is increasing. Especially in the field of electronic products, due to the rapid development of technology and diverse consumer demands, electronic products are being updated and replaced rapidly, resulting in a large number of obsolete and abandoned electronic products. Currently, most electronic product companies effectively recycle electronic waste and repurpose it through remanufacturing methods, turning it into valuable resources. However, remanufacturing poses challenges related to patent authorization, and mishandling of these issues may result in infringement disputes. At present, literature on patent protection focuses on the situation of manufacturers authorizing the distributor and third-party remanufacturer, often neglecting the granting of patents to second-hand manufacturers with remanufacturing capabilities.
In summary, this paper investigates licensing strategies of manufacturers and second-hand manufacturers regarding patent authorization for electronic products. From the perspective of patent protection and power structure, we construct four models: non-licensing and market without a leader, non-licensing and market with a leader, licensing and market without a leader, and licensing and market with a leader. By comparing and analyzing the optimal solution of the model, the optimal authorization strategy is determined, and the impact of various parameter changes (such as recycling price coefficient, transfer markup coefficient, and patent licensing fee) on product sales and profits of all parties is studied.
The research findings suggest that manufacturers and second-hand manufacturers are mutually constrained, regardless of market dominance. The decision to grant patents is not absolute. If both parties seek to reach a licensing agreement, they must establish a reasonable patent authorization fee, taking into account factors such as the recycling price coefficient. In the case of manufacturer authorization, patent restrictions mitigate the extent to which second-hand manufacturers encroach on manufacturer profits. Manufacturer authorization is beneficial for expanding the development of the electronic product market. Without manufacturer authorization, the demand for second-hand products is greater than that for manufacturer authorization, while the demand for new products is lower than that for manufacturer authorization. Manufacturers and second-hand manufacturers can increase their profits by sharing resources and increasing the maximum price consumers are willing to pay. Finally, combined with numerical example analysis, the model results are further validated, and management insights are provided.
There are still some limitations to this article. This article only considers the situation of homogeneity and price between remanufactured products and new products, but does not consider the impact of remanufacturing rate. Future research can further explore the price difference between remanufactured and new products, as well as the impact of remanufacturing rates.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, remanufacturing, patent protection, patent authorization, power structure