关键词: 演化博弈, 安全行为, 多主体, 劳务分包, 前景理论

Abstract: In order to enhance safety management at construction sites involving labor subcontracting, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory, incorporating the general contractor, labor subcontractor, and workers. By integrating risk perception and mental accounting mechanisms, the decision-making behaviors of these three parties under uncertainty are systematically analyzed. A perceived benefit matrix is constructed to reflect the subjective evaluations of gains and losses, incorporating elements such as safety compliance benefits, risk compensation, and potential penalties. Furthermore, replicator dynamic equations are derived and solved to examine strategic interactions and evolutionary pathways among the multiple agents, identifying equilibrium conditions and convergence trends under varying constraints. Numerical simulations using MATLAB are conducted to evaluate how variations in key parameters such as safety management costs, penalty intensity, behavioral valence, and accident losses influence the system’s evolutionary trajectory and stability. These simulations also assess the sensitivity of each party’s decision-making to changes in regulatory and economic conditions.
The results indicate that the stability of the safety management system is significantly affected by these factors. The strategy combination(active management, active management, and safe operation) is identified as the most favorable evolutionary stable strategy, which effectively aligns the interests of all participants while minimizing systemic risks. Enhancing the perceived value of penalties and accident losses for all parties proves effective in guiding the system toward this ideal state by increasing the psychological and financial weight of non-compliance. Additional measures include reducing the psychological reference point for safety investment costs through improved cost-sharing mechanisms and policy incentives, as well as adopting technological means to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safety management. These interventions collectively strengthen risk control capabilities, enhance coordination among stakeholders, and reduce the probability of accidents.
This research integrates behavioral economics with the evolutionary game theory, providing theoretical insights and practical strategies for optimizing safety management in subcontracting-intensive construction environments. The findings highlight the importance of addressing perceptual and psychological factors in safety management systems and offer actionable recommendations for policymakers and project managers to enhance collaborative risk governance. By aligning economic incentives with safety objectives, this study contributes to the development of more resilient and adaptive safety management frameworks in complex construction projects.

Key words: evolutionary game, safety behavior, multi-agent, labor subcontractors, prospect theory