运筹与管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (2): 73-81.

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑零售商风险规避及努力因素的供应链协调与优化模型

许民利1, 王俏1, 欧阳林寒2   

  1. 1.中南大学商学院,湖南 长沙 410083;
    2.南京理工大学 经管学院,江苏 南京 210094
  • 收稿日期:2013-03-01 出版日期:2014-02-25
  • 作者简介:许民利(1969-),男,湖南武冈人,副教授,研究方向:供应链风险管理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71171203);湖南省软科学重点项目(2009ZK2004)

Supply Chain Coordination and Optimization with Risk-averse Retailer and Sales Effort Dependent Demand

XU Min-li1, WANG Qiao1, OU Yang Lin-han2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Central South University, Changsha410083, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China
  • Received:2013-03-01 Online:2014-02-25

摘要: 引入零售商风险规避偏好,在努力水平影响需求的两种模式下,分别建立了销售回馈与惩罚契约模型。随后,探讨了单纯的销售回馈与惩罚契约能否实现供应链协调,以及协调时各契约参数满足的条件。最后,通过数值分析对契约的协调性进行进一步分析。

关键词: 风险规避, 努力水平, 销售回馈与惩罚契约, 供应链协调与优化

Abstract: This paper introduces the retailer's risk aversion in a two stage supply chain. Under both the additive and multiplicative sales effort dependent demands, the issue of supply chain coordination and optimization with risk-averse retailer and sales effort sensitive demand under a single sales rebate and penalty contract is explored. Besides, the optimal conditions that the contract parameters must satisfy in order to achieve supply chain coordination are determined. Numerical analysis is presented to further illustrate the role of sales rebate and penalty contract.

Key words: risk aversion, sales effort, sales rebate and penalty contract, supply chain coordination and optimization

中图分类号: