运筹与管理 ›› 2016, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (6): 18-24.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2016.0196

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

双重价格规制下三渠道季节性产品供应链跨期风险共担机制研究

彭红军1, 周梅华2, 王夫东2   

  1. 1.南京林业大学 经济与管理学院,江苏 南京 210037;
    2.中国矿业大学 管理学院,江苏 徐州 221116
  • 收稿日期:2015-02-28 出版日期:2016-12-20
  • 作者简介:彭红军(1980-),男,安徽池州人,博士,副教授,在站博士后,从事供应链管理、系统工程、金融工程等研究。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目资助(71201164);教育部人文社会科学研究项目资助(16YJC630092);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2014M561658);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目资助(2014SJB050);南京林业大学高层次人才基金项目资助(GXL2014050)   作者简介:彭红军(1980-),男,安徽池州人,博士,副教授,在站博士后,从事供应链管理、系统工程、金融工程等研究。双重价格规制下三渠道季节性产品供应链跨期风险共担机制研究彭红军1, 周梅华2, 王夫东2(1.南京林业大学 经济与管理学院,江苏 南京 210037; 2.中国矿业大学 管理学院,江苏 徐州 221116)摘 要:以双重价格规制下三渠道季节性产品供应链为研究对象,首先通过构建序贯博弈模型,研究供应链的淡季和旺季的最优决策和利润,在此基础上构建跨期风险共担协调契约和模型,以实现供应链总利润最大化和供应链企业的双赢。研究表明,由于渠道1的原材料价格受到上限规制,旺季供应商不能完全兑现制造商的订购量;由于最终产品的价格受到严格规制,旺季产成品的供应短缺的概率增加;跨期风险共担机制使得供应商和制造商的决策与集成供应链的决策完全一致,供应链总利润达到集成决策时的利润水平;研究还表明,供应商和制造商的渠道集成决策下,旺季产成品的供应缺货的概率进一步加大。

Multi-Period Risk Sharing Contract for Three-Channel Supply Chainof Seasonal Products Under Double Price Regulation

PENG Hong-jun1, ZHOU Mei-hua2, WANG Fu-dong2   

  1. 1.College of economics and management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, China;
    2.School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China
  • Received:2015-02-28 Online:2016-12-20

摘要: 以双重价格规制下三渠道季节性产品供应链为研究对象,首先通过构建序贯博弈模型,研究供应链的淡季和旺季的最优决策和利润,在此基础上构建跨期风险共担协调契约和模型,以实现供应链总利润最大化和供应链企业的双赢。研究表明,由于渠道1的原材料价格受到上限规制,旺季供应商不能完全兑现制造商的订购量;由于最终产品的价格受到严格规制,旺季产成品的供应短缺的概率增加;跨期风险共担机制使得供应商和制造商的决策与集成供应链的决策完全一致,供应链总利润达到集成决策时的利润水平;研究还表明,供应商和制造商的渠道集成决策下,旺季产成品的供应缺货的概率进一步加大。

关键词: 三渠道供应链, 双重价格规制, 季节性产品, 跨期风险共担

Abstract: Taking the three-channel supply chain of seasonal products under double price regulation as a study object, the optimal decision-making and profit in high season and low season are researched. On this basis, the coordination contract and model on multi-period risk sharing are established, in order to achieve the total profit maximization of the supply chains and a win-win situation for all enterprises. The research indicates that as the raw materials in channel 1 are subject to the price cap regulation, the ordering could not be completely fulfilled in high season. As the price of the final product is strictly regulated, the shortage probability of finished goods supply may be increased in high season; Under the multi-period risk sharing mechanism, the decisions of the supplier and the manufacturer are consistent with decision of the centralized case, so that the spillover profits under the inter-temporal coordination mechanism are allocated on a win-win basis. Under the channel coordination of the supplier and the manufacturer, however, the shortage probability of finished goods supply may be increased further in high season.

Key words: three-channel supply chain, double price regulation, seasonal product, multi-period risk sharing

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