基于合作博弈的组装供应链转移定价策略

doi:10.12005/orms.2016.0198

运筹与管理 ›› 2016, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (6): 34-38.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2016.0198

基于合作博弈的组装供应链转移定价策略

李昌文^1,2, 周永务¹, 卓翔芝², 肖旦³

1华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州 510641;
2.淮北师范大学经济学院,安徽淮北 235000;
3广州大学工商管理学院,广东广州 510006

收稿日期:2014-06-12 出版日期:2016-12-20
作者简介:李昌文(1979-),男,安徽潜山人,讲师,博士生,研究方向:供应链联盟运作管理;周永务(1964-),男,安徽庐江人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:运筹与优化,物流与供应链管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71520107001,7151077);教育部人文社科青年资助项目(15YJC630053,16YJA630003);安徽省高校省级自然科学研究重点项目(KJ2015A335)

Transfer Pricing Strategy in an Assembly Supply Chain Basedon Cooperative Game Analysis

LI Chang-wen^1,2, ZHOU Yong-wu¹, ZHUO Xiang-zhi², XIAO Dan³

1.School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641,China;
2.School of Economics, Huaibei Normal University, Huaibei 235000, China;
3.School of Business Administration, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510641, China

Received:2014-06-12 Online:2016-12-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究了由n个供应互补的原料产品的上游供应商和一个组装生产最终产品的下游组装商组成的集团公司内部的转移价格问题。其中下游组装商面临的是一个价格敏感型的需求。每个上游供应商可以独立决策其销售价格,并决定是否以谈判的价格出售原料产品给下游组装商。供应链系统内的所有供应商和组装商都可以自由决定彼此之间是否进行合作。结果表明,在大联盟结构下,供应链的利润是最高的。为了分配大联盟结构下供应链系统总的利润,本文构造了特征函数具有超模性质的合作博弈,并利用Shapley值分配方法给出了整个供应链系统内部的转移价格。

关键词: 组装供应链, 转移价格, 合作博弈, 核, Shapley值

Abstract: The transfer pricing decision for a integrated assembly system with n upstream suppliers and a downstream assembler is considered, where the upstream suppliers sell n complementary components to a downstream assembler, then the downstream assembler sell products to the market. The downstream division faces a price-sensitive deterministic demand. The n upstream suppliers can independently determine their retail prices to the downstream assembler, and decide whether or not they will sell to the downstream assembler at negotiated transfer prices. Each supplier and assembler have the freedom to decide whether to cooperate with each other. The results show that the profit of the assembly system is the highest in the grand coalition structure. To allocate the system-wide profit between upstream suppliers and downstream assembler, we construct a cooperative game, show the supermodular of the game, and then compute the Shapley value-based transfer prices for the assembly system.

Key words: assembly supply chain, transfer price, cooperative game, core, Shapley value

中图分类号:

F224.3

李昌文, 周永务, 卓翔芝, 肖旦. 基于合作博弈的组装供应链转移定价策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2016, 25(6): 34-38.

LI Chang-wen, ZHOU Yong-wu, ZHUO Xiang-zhi, XIAO Dan. Transfer Pricing Strategy in an Assembly Supply Chain Basedon Cooperative Game Analysis[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2016, 25(6): 34-38.

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基于合作博弈的组装供应链转移定价策略

Transfer Pricing Strategy in an Assembly Supply Chain Basedon Cooperative Game Analysis

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