强制减排规制下基于碳减排利润增量分享契约的供应链协调研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0108

运筹与管理 ›› 2019, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (5): 92-98.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0108

强制减排规制下基于碳减排利润增量分享契约的供应链协调研究

夏良杰¹,柳慧¹,张萌¹,原白云²,李妍³

1.天津财经大学商学院,天津 300222;
2.河南理工大学工商管理学院能源经济研究中心,河南焦作 454000;
3.中国石油集团渤海钻探工程有限公司渤海钻探工程技术研究院,天津 300457

收稿日期:2018-04-28 出版日期:2019-05-25
作者简介:夏良杰(1980-),男,湖北石首人,副教授,管理学博士,研究方向:物流与供应链管理;柳慧(1994-),女,山东济宁人,硕士研究生,研究方向:产业经济;原白云(1983-),女,河南焦作人,讲师,管理学博士,研究方向:物流与供应链管理;李妍(1985-),女,河北滦南人,中级经济师,管理学学士,研究方向:产业经济。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502123,71502050);天津财经大学研究生科研资助计划项目(2017TCS03)

Supply Chain Coordination Based on Incremental Profit Sharing Contract of Carbon Emission Reduction under Mandatory Carbon Emissions Capacity Scheme

XIA Liang-jie¹, LIU Hui¹, ZHANG Meng¹, YUAN Bai-yun², LI Yan³

1.School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China;
2.Research Center for Energy Economics, School of Business Administration, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454000, China;
3.Institute of Bohai Drilling Engineering, CNPC Bohai Drilling Engineering Company Limited, Tianjin 300457, China

Received:2018-04-28 Online:2019-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 碳减排会增加制造商的成本,导致批发价和零售价提高,从而抑制市场需求。以此为背景,本文针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,研究了强制减排规制下考虑消费者低碳偏好时的供应链决策与协调。通过设计碳减排利润增量分享契约协调制造商和零售商的决策,实现帕累托改进,利用Rubinstein讨价还价模型最终确定减排利润分享比例。研究发现,实施碳减排利润分享契约能有效提高零售商的订货量,并降低批发价格;制造商的利润随着消费者低碳意识提高而提高;当净化率较低时,零售商的利润随消费者低碳意识提高而提高;当净化率较高时,零售商的利润随消费者低碳意识提高而降低;最后,论文通过数值模拟验证了碳减排利润分享契约的有效性。

关键词: 消费者低碳意识, 利润分享, 强制减排, 供应链协调

Abstract: Carbon emission reduction increases the manufacturer’s cost, so that the manufacturer and retailer may improve the wholesale price and retail price respectively. Therefore, the market demand will be suppressed. Under the mandatory emissions carbon capacity scheme, this paper focuses on a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, and studies the channel members’ decision-making and channel coordination considering consumer low-carbon awareness. This paper provides an incremental profit sharing contract of carbon emission reduction to coordinate the decision making of the manufacturer and retailer and the Pareto improvement is achieved. Then, the paper adopts the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the proportion of incremental profit sharing of emission reduction. The study finds that the contract can effectively improve the retailer’s order quantity and reduce the wholesale price. Consumer low-carbon awareness has a different impact on the profits of manufacturers and retailers under different carbon emission reduction rates. The manufacturer’s optimal profit increases with consumer low-carbon awareness. As consumer low-carbon awareness increases, the retailer’s optimal profit increases in case of high carbon emission reduction rates and decreases in case of low carbon emission reduction rates. Finally, the paper verifies the validity of carbon emission reduction profit sharing contract with numerical simulation.

Key words: consumer low-carbon awareness, profit sharing, mandatory emissions carbon capacity, supply chain coordination

中图分类号:

F224.32

夏良杰,柳慧,张萌,原白云,李妍. 强制减排规制下基于碳减排利润增量分享契约的供应链协调研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(5): 92-98.

XIA Liang-jie, LIU Hui, ZHANG Meng, YUAN Bai-yun, LI Yan. Supply Chain Coordination Based on Incremental Profit Sharing Contract of Carbon Emission Reduction under Mandatory Carbon Emissions Capacity Scheme[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(5): 92-98.

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强制减排规制下基于碳减排利润增量分享契约的供应链协调研究

Supply Chain Coordination Based on Incremental Profit Sharing Contract of Carbon Emission Reduction under Mandatory Carbon Emissions Capacity Scheme

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