关键词: 环境规制, 地方政府, 公众, 三方博弈

Abstract: Firstly, this paper constructs a two-party evolutionary game model of central government and local government in environmental regulation. On this basis, taking the public as the third party participant, it constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of central government, local government and the public, compares the differences between the two-party and three-party game models in detail, and explores the influencing factors of each main body's strategic behavior. The results show that: (1)Without public participation, the implementation strategy of local government's environmental regulation is mainly affected by the cost, environmental benefit and economic loss of local government's active implementation, the environmental performance loss of passive implementation of environmental regulation, the intensity of central government's supervision, governance subsidy and punishment to local government, etc. The supervision strategy of central government is mainly affected by the cost of strict supervision and the governance subsidies and penalties of local government and other factors. After introducing public participation, on the basis of the game between central and local governments, the influencing factors of the implementation strategy of local government environmental regulation also increase the additional penalties that local governments are subjected to after being reported. The influencing factors of the central government's supervision strategy also increase the intensity of central government's supervision, the additional penalties to local governments and the loss of the credibility of the central government. (2)Without public participation, the probability of the central government's strict supervision strategy decreases with the increase of the probability of the local government's active implementation. After the introduction of public participation, the probability of the central government's strict supervision strategy increases with the increase of the probability of the local government's active implementation. It shows that under the participation of the public, the restraining effect of the local government's active implementation of environmental regulations on the central government's strict supervision has changed into a promoting role. (3)The probability of active implementation by local governments and strict supervision by the central government increase with the increase of the probability of public reporting. It shows that public participation not only promotes local governments to undertake environmental responsibility, but also helps to promote the central government to implement environmental governance policies.

Key words: environmental regulation, local government, public, tripartite game