Abstract: Through low carbon development to promote sustainable economic development is the forefront of research. This paper discusses the issue of carbon emission in China’s equipment manufacturing enterprises, the three party evolutionary game model of equipment manufacturing enterprise, government and three party supervision institution is set up under the background of low-carbon. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, the results showed that: The low carbon evolution decision of equipment manufacturing enterprises is the result of the game between three parties, and the evolution of single variable is limited; There should be no production in the traditional way to the chances of enterprises under the background of low carbon; government regulation cost and reduce the equipment manufacturing enterprises in the low carbon transition cost, increase the traditional manufacturing enterprises and the third party supervision mechanism does not perform the duty of supervision of the penalty, increase the low carbon production enterprises subsidies, can effectively promote the three party subject to the ideal evolution of low carbon operation mode.

Key words: equipment manufacturing enterprises, government, third party regulatory agencies, evolutionary game, carbon emission reduction

摘要： 低碳发展模式逐渐引起了社会各界对环境问题的关注,发展低碳经济以促进经济的可持续发展,是现阶段研究的前沿问题。本文针对中国装备制造企业碳排放问题,构建了低碳背景下装备制造企业、政府及第三方监管机构的三方演化博弈模型,研究在碳减排过程中三方主体的演化规律及影响系统演化至理想状态的影响因素和机理。通过理论研究和数值仿真,得出结果:装备制造企业的低碳演化决策是三方主体共同博弈的结果,只研究单一变量的演化结果有局限性;低碳背景下企业不应该存在继续以传统方式生产的侥幸心理;降低政府的低碳调控成本、降低装备制造企业的低碳转型成本、加大对传统生产企业和不履行监管职责的第三方监管机构的罚款力度,加大对低碳生产企业的补贴力度等方式能够有效的推动三方主体向理想低碳运营模式演化。

关键词: 装备制造企业, 政府, 第三方监管机构, 演化博弈, 碳减排