Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2022, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (10): 227-234.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0343

• Management Science • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Research on the Cooperation Formation Mechanism of Non-complete Interest Groups in PPP Projects

CHENG Fan, DENG Bin-chao, YIN Yi-lin   

  1. School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300848, China
  • Received:2020-09-17 Online:2022-10-25 Published:2022-11-14

PPP项目中非完全利益群体的合作形成机制研究

程帆, 邓斌超, 尹贻林   

  1. 天津理工大学 管理学院,天津 300384
  • 作者简介:程帆(1996-),女,天津人,硕士研究生,研究方向为公共项目治理;邓斌超(1985-),男,江西鹰潭人,讲师,博士,研究方向为公共项目治理与博弈;尹贻林(1957-),男,山东平阴人,教授,博士,博士生导师,研究方向为公共项目管理与工程造价。
  • 基金资助:
    自然科学基金青年项目(71602144);天津市教委人文社科重大项目(2017JWZD15)

Abstract: One entry point of alleviating the plight in the cooperation in PPP projects is to coordinate the interest divergence in the cooperation between the government and the social capital, and further achieve the convergence of individual rationality to collective rationality. Based on the cooperative game theory, this article introduces a cooperative formation mechanism for the non-complete interest groups in the PPP projects, and analyses the key factors for achieving the “win-win cooperation” between the government and social capital. The study shows that the non-complete interest groups of PPP projects composed of the government and social capital may take the initiative to adopt the optimal cooperation strategy under the synergy of the mechanism of “rationality-transfer of utility-effective negotiation”. Among them,the mechanism of rationality verifies the precondition for achieving the intention to cooperate between the government and the social capital,the mechanism of transfer of utility can help to realise the risk-return equivalence between the two parties, and the mechanism of effective negotiation can achieve the Pareto optimality in the cooperation between the government and the social capital.

Key words: PPP projects, non-complete interest groups, cooperative formation mechanism, cooperative game

摘要: 协调政府与社会资本合作的利益分歧,进而实现个体理性向集体理性的趋同,这是纾解PPP项目合作困境的切入点之一。基于合作博弈理论,本文构建PPP项目非完全利益群体的合作形成机制,分析政府与社会资本间“合作共赢”的必要因素。研究表明,由政府与社会资本组成的PPP项目非完全利益群体,可在“理性-效用转移-有效协商”机制的协同作用下主动采取最优合作策略。其中,理性机制验证了政府与社会资本达成合作意向的前提,效用转移机制可实现二者之间的风险-收益对等,有效协商机制将达成政府与社会资本合作的帕累托均衡。

关键词: PPP项目, 非完全利益群体, 合作形成机制, 合作博弈

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