Abstract: With the changes in the international situation and the development of the strategic game pattern of major powers, the modernization process of the country’s national defense is accelerating, and new equipment is being added to the army at an accelerated pace, which has brought new challenges to the complex weapon equipment manufacturing enterprise. Improving the delivery efficiency of complex weapon equipment has become a hot issue of concern in all circles. In order to scientifically build the complex weapon equipment delivery system, the key factor that restricts the improvement of delivery efficiency, namely the efficiency of dealing with delivery problems, is studied. Due to the particularity of the complex weapon equipment, it needs to be rechecked during the delivery stage, leading to a series of delivery problems. The continuity of the causes of delivery problems leads to the buck-passing and low enthusiasm for problem handling between departments. The poor quality of problem handling leads to rework of problems. And then, the long problem-handling cycle will affect delivery efficiency and customer satisfaction. According to the data, the average single problem-handling cycle of a certain type of weapon equipment is 3 days, and the number of delivery problems of this type reaches hundreds. Compared with the seven-day delivery plan of international aviation companies, such as Boeing and Airbus, the average delivery cycle is as long as three months, which lags behind the international advanced level. In the long run, this will hurt the overall reputation of the company and will not be conducive to the economic development of the company. In order to improve delivery efficiency, it is urgent to design an incentive contract to encourage various departments to actively handle delivery problems and improve the efficiency of problem handling.
   Based on this, the management philosophy of “high quality, punctuality and low cost” of complex weapon equipment manufacturing enterprises is integrated into the research. Relying on the extended multi-task dual-agent principal-agent model, the principal-agent relationship between a principal (the main management department of complex weapon equipment delivery, referred to as the delivery center in this paper) and two agents (departments that can deal with delivery problems during the delivery process) is considered. The Cobb-Douglas production function is used to represent the output benefits, which is close to the current situation of “single task failure to meet the standard leads to delayed delivery” in practice, and the relative importance and complete irreplaceability of multiple tasks are balanced, which makes up for the defects of linear output expression. At the same time, comprehensively considering the emotional factor, the risk factor, and complex relationships, the multi-task delivery incentive model has been constructed, which takes the delivery problem handling cycle, quality, and cost as tasks. The study will explore the design method of incentive contracts when the fairness preference agent relationship is neutral, competitive, and cooperative. And the influence of various factors on the effectiveness of incentive contracts is analyzed so that the fairness preference agent can be motivated to actively deal with problems in different relationships to maximize the delivery utility.
   The study shows that the competitive and cooperative relationship between technical business departments promotes the exposure of effort-input information, which can reduce the degree of information asymmetry. The delivery center can promote departments to deepen collaboration to improve delivery efficiency. The multidimensionality of delivery tasks requires the delivery center to consider the relative importance in a balanced way when making decisions. The strategic goals of enterprises change with the development of national strategies and social and economic environment, and the focuses at different stages are also different. When making decisions, each department tends to prefer tasks with relatively high importance and low effort costs so the delivery center needs to balance the cost and importance of each task and drive each department to invest more in important tasks. Incentive contracts can be designed according to the development goals of enterprises at different stages. Conservative technical business departments will take a wait-and-see attitude and lack innovation in organizational changes and business transfers, so they will be distinguished from adventurous technical business departments when incentivizing them. When the relationship between departments is different, the incentive contract will be different. The appropriate incentive contract can be selected according to the type of problem. The optimal incentive coefficient is affected by the department’s factors and there is a weak incentive zone. The internal perception and external environment of the delivery link will lead to changes in the relationship between departments. Therefore, the delivery center can appropriately adjust the delivery environment to achieve the incentive effect. Finally, the case study of the paint quality problem of the aircraft support equipment cockpit ladder in the delivery process of an aviation weapon equipment development and production company is used to verify the conclusions of this study so as to provide theoretical support for the design of incentive contracts in the delivery process of complex weapon equipment. However, the study still has certain limitations. It can be expanded in the direction of the correlation of multi-task effort costs and the dynamic change in task importance in the future.

Key words: complex weapon equipment, fairness preference, multi-task, principal-agent, incentive contract

摘要： 复杂武器装备交付效率直接影响国防战斗力的转化。以交付问题处理周期、质量、成本为任务,形成公平偏好代理人交付激励模型,探究代理人关系为中立、竞争、合作时激励契约的设计方法。研究表明最优努力水平与努力成本、风险感知水平负相关,与技术水平、合作系数正相关;保守型部门相对于冒险型部门努力水平较低,其行为偏向于在相对重要且努力成本低的任务上多投入;当部门间相互关系不同时激励契约不同,可根据问题类型选择合适的激励契约;最优激励系数受部门自身因素影响存在弱激励区。最后通过案例验证本文研究结论,为复杂武器装备交付环节激励契约设计提供理论支撑。

关键词: 复杂武器装备, 公平偏好, 多任务, 委托代理, 激励契约