One Leader-Multi-Followers Oligopolistic Competition Model on the Condition Inverse Demand Function is Set-Value

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2014, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (2): 163-166.

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study • Previous Articles Next Articles

One Leader-Multi-Followers Oligopolistic Competition Model on the Condition Inverse Demand Function is Set-Value

WANG Neng-fa¹, YANG Zhe²

1. School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550004, China;
2. Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China

Received:2012-11-06 Online:2014-02-25

反需求函数集值情况下单主多从寡头竞争模型

王能发¹, 杨哲²

1.贵州财经大学数学与统计学院,贵州贵阳 550004;
2.上海财经大学经济学院,上海 200433

作者简介:王能发(1983-),男,讲师,硕士,研究方向:博弈论与非线性分析;杨哲(1983-),男,副教授,经济学博士,研究方向:博弈论与数理经济学。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(11161015);贵州省科学技术基金资助项目(黔科合J字[2011]2096);贵州省教育厅自然科学基金资助项目(黔教科2010029);上海财经大学“数理经济学”教育部重点实验室开放课题(201309KF02)

Abstract

Abstract: In the reality, the demand function may not be a single value, but set-value. One leader-multi-followers oligarchic competition model is studied. The set-value inverse demand function is analyzed, and the property of following oligarchs reaction function is given. Furthermoure, the existence of Stackelberg-Cournot Nash equilibrium(SCN)is proved.

Key words: set-value inverse demand function, oligarchic competition model, stackelberg-cournot nash equilibrium, existence

摘要： 现实中反需求函数可能不是单值的,而是集值的.在这种情况下,研究单主多从寡头竞争模型。对集值反需求函数进行分析,给出跟随寡头的反应函数性质,证明模型Stackelberg-Cournot Nash均衡(SCN均衡)的存在性。

关键词: 集值反需求函数, 寡头竞争模型, StackelbergCournot Nash均衡, 存在性

CLC Number:

F224.32
O225

WANG Neng-fa, YANG Zhe. One Leader-Multi-Followers Oligopolistic Competition Model on the Condition Inverse Demand Function is Set-Value[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(2): 163-166.

王能发, 杨哲. 反需求函数集值情况下单主多从寡头竞争模型[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(2): 163-166.

References

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One Leader-Multi-Followers Oligopolistic Competition Model on the Condition Inverse Demand Function is Set-Value

反需求函数集值情况下单主多从寡头竞争模型

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