Abstract: In this paper, using a Stackelberg game model, we study supply chain effects of retailer's innovation investment for mixed channels. We obtain the partners' closed form solutions of decisive variables and profits under both complete and incomplete information about the retailer's cost parameter of innovation investment, and analyze how this cost parameter, uncertainty degree of the manufacturer about the retailer's cost structure, customers migration rate, base demand of market, innovation potential influence them. We find that the manufacturer would always benefit by obtaining more cost information, and the conditions under which the retailer would be willing to share information with the manufacturer and whole supply chain would improve. All these would help the manufacturer to decide about an information sharing contract with the retailer. Finally, the numerical examples are provided to verify the conclusions.

Key words: supply chain, innovation investment, information asymmetry, stackelberg game, mixed channels1

摘要： 通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了在混合渠道下零售商创新投入对供应链的影响,分析了零售商创新成本系数信息对称和不对称两种情况下各方的决策变量和利润受创新成本系数,制造商对零售商创新信息掌握的不确定性程度,需求转移系数,市场潜力及创新潜力等的影响关系。研究结果发现制造商总能通过信息分享受益,另外得到了零售商愿意分享成本信息以及使得供应链整体受益的条件,这些为制造商信息分享决策提供了依据。最后通过算例分析对结果进行了验证。

关键词: 供应链, 创新投入, 信息不对称, Stackelberg博弈, 混合渠道