The Model between the Pure Binding and Component Sales in the Oligarchic Monopoly Market
TAO Na1, ZHANG Sheng2
1. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, China; 2. School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, China
TAO Na, ZHANG Sheng. The Model between the Pure Binding and Component Sales in the Oligarchic Monopoly Market[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(5): 187-191.
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