Abstract: By considering that the supply side is composed of duopoly car companies, this paper employes no “double credits” policy constraint as the reference condition, and builds two models of whether fuel vehicles could reduce emissions or not when there is the “double credits” policy constraint. Further, three Bertrand game analysis is carried out to explore the mechanism of the “double credits” policy on the development of fuel vehicles and new energy vehicles from the perspective of pricing, which is followed by a numerical analysis to further verify the effect of the “double credits” policy. The findings are as follows, (1)the credit setting of each NEV significantly affects the effect of “double credits” policy, and an excessive NEV credit setting could not improve the emission reduction of fuel vehicles, while there is a reasonable integral that can achieve the dual purpose of “encouraging advanced technology and restricting behindhand one”. (2)The “double credits” policy has negative impacts on such manufacturers involving fuel vehicles production (e.g. M1), and it will get a lower profit compared with no “double credits” policy when the credit of each NEV is small. (3)The “double credits” policy is beneficial to such manufacturers producing NEV only (e.g. M2), and it will always get a higher profit compared with no “double credits” policy.

Key words: “double credits” policy, bertrand game, pricing decision, emission reduction level

摘要： 考虑供给侧为双寡头车企组成的汽车卖场,以没有“双积分”政策约束作为参照条件,构建有“双积分”政策约束时燃油车是否减排的模型,分别对其进行Bertrand博弈求解分析,从定价视角探讨“双积分”政策对燃油车和新能源汽车发展的作用机制,并通过数值分析进一步直观验证“双积分”政策的作用效果。研究表明:每台新能源汽车积分值设置过大不利于促进燃油车减排水平的提高,且存在合理的新能源汽车积分值区间,可以实现“既鼓励先进,又制约落后”的双重目的。“双积分”政策对涉及燃油车生产的制造商不利,当每台新能源汽车积分值较小时,其获得的利润较无“双积分”政策约束时减小;对仅生产新能源汽车的制造商有利,其获得的利润总是较无“双积分”政策约束时增大。

关键词: “双积分”政策, Bertrand博弈, 定价决策, 减排水平