Abstract: In this paper, a supply chain model composed of two manufactures and a retailer is presented , where the two manufactures provide the retailer with imperfect complementary products(P1 and P2 respectively)and the retailer sales the two products as mixed bundle, to obtain the optimal pricing decisions of manufactures and retailer. We consider decision-making under three scenarios: (1)completely noncooperative game(CNG); (2)partial-cooperative game(PCG); (3)cooperative game(CG). The pricing decisions under the first two scenarios reveal that compared with decisions under completely noncooperative game, what is obtained by using Sharply Value under partial-cooperative game is definitely beneficial for the manufactures and is Pareto improving for the retailer’s profit with certain imperative conditions met. Based on the above results, we get the optimal pricing decisions, which can not only eliminate the horizontal channel conflict between the manufactures, but also eliminate vertical channel conflict among all participants, with the help of Nash bargaining model. The results show that the demands of the two products in cooperative game are twice as many as that in partial-cooperative game; and each number’s profit in this scenario is evidently superior to that in the other two scenarios. To verify our conclusions above, some numerical experiments are followed at last.

Key words: upply chain management, pricing decisions, game, imperfect complementary products

摘要： 建立一个由两个制造商和一个零售商组成供应链模型,以求解制造商和零售商的最优定价决策,其中两个制造商向零售商批发的产品是不完美互补的,且零售商采取混合捆绑策略销售这两种产品。考虑三种情形下的决策:(1)完全非合作博弈;(2)局部合作博弈;(3)合作博弈。通过比较前两种情形下的决策,利用Nash协商模型求解得到消除水平和垂直供应链冲突的最优定价决策。与完全非合作博弈决策相比,局部合作博弈决策对制造商是有利的,在一定的条件下也可以实现对零售商收益的帕累托改进;而合作博弈决策在任何情况下都要明显地优于完全非合作博弈决策以及局部合作博弈决策,同时合作博弈决策下的最优产品需求量相比局部合作博弈决策下的最优产品需求量提高了一倍。最后,通过数值试验验证了文章所得结论。

关键词: 供应链管理, 定价决策, 博弈, 不完美互补产品