Abstract: In the symmetry independent private value model with bidding cost, the paper builds a first-price sealed bidding game model and provides the symmetric cut-off strategy & bidding equilibrium. The research indicates that transaction costs exclude bidders of high cost type, but cause the uncertainty of bidders' participation. To decrease the possibility of inefficient bidding, the tenders must limit the number of potential bidders. In addition, it is profitable for the participators to reduce the transaction costs and it is practicable for tenders to subsidize the bidders to encourage their participation in the bidding.

Key words: management science and engineering, bidding strategy, game theory, first-price sealed bidding, transaction costs

摘要： 本文在独立私人价值模型的基础上,通过引入投标成本,建立了考虑交易费用的一级价格密封招标博弈模型,给出了对称的进入点均衡和相应的对称均衡报价策略。研究表明,交易费用的出现排除了高成本类型的投标者,但也导致了竞标人数的不确定性,招标方为了降低招标无效率的可能性,必须限制潜在投标者人数;另一方面,在招投标过程中降低交易费用对交易双方来说都是有利的,招标方给予投标者投标补偿以激励其参与竞标的机制是可行的。

关键词: 管理科学与工程, 投标策略, 博弈论, 一级密封招标, 交易费用