Abstract: The adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry between the travel agency and the tour guides in the tourism service supply do make damage to the travel agency's interests, so an important question is how the travel agency can screen the true ability of the tour guides and provide incentive mechanism to make them work more effectively. The tour guides' two kinds of private information, which are the service ability and the effort level cannot be observed, but their service performance can be measured by the travel agency. This paper designs the incentive mechanism by using game theory, information economics theory, etc., under the condition that the tour guides' service ability is continuous, and obtains the parameters of the optimal incentive mechanism by using optimization theory. The results show that the travel agency shall design different incentive mechanisms for the tour guides who possess different service ability. The incentive mechanism under dual asymmetric information not only has the function of self-selection screening for the tour guides, but also can induce them to enhance their effort level.

Key words: principal-agent, screening and incentive, mechanism design, dual asymmetric information, continuous service ability

摘要： 旅游服务供应链中,旅行社与导游之间的信息非对称而导致的逆向选择和道德风险问题将损害旅行社的利益,因此,如何对导游进行有效甄别与激励是旅行社所要关注的一个重要问题。以导游的服务能力和努力水平两种私有信息不被旅行社所观察到,但其服务业绩可以被观测到为基础,利用博弈论与信息经济学等理论和方法设计了导游的服务能力为连续类型下的激励机制,运用最优化原理得出了最优激励机制参数。结果表明,旅行社应对不同服务能力的导游设计一揽子形式的不同的激励机制。双重非对称信息下的激励机制不仅能对导游起到自我选择的甄别作用,还能起到诱导导游提高工作努力水平的激励作用。

关键词: 委托代理, 甄别与激励, 机制设计, 双重非对称信息, 服务能力连续