Abstract: As an innovative financial service, digital finance can provide more efficient and convenient financial services for various industries and promote the development of technology, industry and society. However, due to the characteristics of digital finance such as high concealment, cross-border, decentralization and intelligence, the rapid development of digital finance also makes the financial supervision more complicated and puts forward higher requirements for the supervisory capacity of regulators. Therefore, it is of both important theoretical value and practical significance to deeply analyze the dynamics, mechanisms and strategies of digital financial innovation carried out by financial institutions, explore how regulators can build a scientific regulatory system to effectively protect the enthusiasm of digital financial innovation while strengthening the supervision of digital financial innovation.
At present, scholars have studied digital financial innovation and regulation from different perspectives using different methods. However, there are few studies on the dynamic evolutionary game process of digital financial innovation and regulation, and most of them use the research framework of a general evolutionary game model without fully considering the impact of the dynamics of reward and punishment mechanism on digital financial innovation and regulation. This paper builds an evolutionary game model between digital financial innovation and supervision. On the one hand, dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is introduced to deeply analyze the influence of reward and punishment intensity on the dynamic evolution of digital financial innovation behavior under the situation that regulators implement dynamic reward and punishment mechanism. On the other hand, in order to reflect the dynamic evolution behavior of digital financial enterprises and regulatory institutions more clearly and intuitively, simulation analysis is applied to analyze the influence of various parameters on the evolutionary game equilibrium. Finally, through the construction of the regression model, the paper further verifies and discusses the internal relationship between digital financial innovation behavior and government regulation by using empirical test.
The results show that when the intensity of reward and punishment is adjusted in time with the probability change of compliance innovation of digital financial enterprises, the game process of game players can reach evolutionary stability, and the effective supervision of regulatory agencies on the innovative behavior of digital financial enterprises can be realized. The intensity of rewards and punishments has different impacts on digital financial enterprises and regulators. When regulators increase the intensity of punishment, the probability of compliance innovation of digital financial enterprises will increase, while the probability of active supervision of regulators will decrease. When regulators increase incentives, the probability of compliance innovation of digital financial enterprises and active supervision by regulators will decrease, and the probability of active supervision by regulators will decrease more obviously. When the cost difference between different regulatory strategies of regulators is smaller and the cost difference between different innovation strategies of digital financial enterprises is larger, digital financial enterprises will tend to make compliance innovation. When the cost difference between different regulatory strategies, the upper limit of rewards and punishments and the cost difference between different innovation strategies of digital financial enterprises are smaller, the regulatory agencies will tend to actively regulate. The regulatory strength will have a significant impact on the digital financial innovation behavior. Within a certain range, when the regulatory strength increases, the digital financial compliance innovation behavior will also increase. When regulators increase the reward for digital financial compliance innovation and the punishment for illegal digital financial innovation, digital financial compliance innovation will be promoted.
In subsequent studies, we will further explore and study the evolutionary game relationship between digital financial innovation and regulation involving more subjects, such as the introduction of social public, social media and other subjects in the study, so as to make the research results more abundant and reliable.

Key words: digital finance, evolutionary game, financial supervision, reward and punishment mechanism

摘要： 数字金融创新是我国经济与社会发展的新动能,然而,如果缺乏监管也会给经济与社会发展造成巨大影响。为深入探究动态奖惩机制对数字金融企业创新行为的影响机理,基于动态奖惩机制建立数字金融企业创新行为演化博弈模型,探讨博弈双方的演化策略,仿真分析演化博弈均衡的条件,并在此基础上构建回归模型对其内在机理进行实证分析。结果表明:在动态奖惩机制下,系统能达到演化稳定且演化稳定策略唯一。奖惩力度对数字金融企业和监管机构有着不同的影响,监管机构加大惩罚力度时,数字金融企业合规创新概率增大,监管机构积极监管概率减小;监管机构加大奖励力度时,数字金融企业合规创新与监管机构积极监管概率均变小,监管机构积极监管概率减小幅度更为明显;监管机构的监管力度会对数字金融创新行为有明显影响,在一定范围内,监管力度增大时,数字金融创新行为也会随之增多,科学合理的监管更有利于数字金融创新活动的健康发展。

关键词: 数字金融, 演化博弈, 金融监管, 奖惩机制