关键词: 环境NGO, 企业, 碳排放, 三方主体博弈

Abstract: In tackling the issue of carbon emission in the context of sustainable development in China, the paper has constructed trilateral evolutionary game model of enterprises, government and environmental NGOs and its replicator dynamics equation; in the mean time, 10 break-even points has been identified and analyzed in terms of their local stability, followed by a numerical simulation regarding the evolutionary process of interactive behavior of the three parties with the assistance of Matlab. The paper also investigates how changing certain parameters may affect the results of the system, exploring the factors and mechanism which may hinder the optimization of the system. Findings of the study suggest that cost needed in carrying out low-carbon production is the major influencing factor which determines the enterprises’ choice on low-carbon production. Government's choice on whether to adopt regulatory procedures is primarily determined by the penalty posed on enterprises and the cost of implementing regulative principle. Environmental NGOs’ choice on whether to inspect is vastly dependent upon the scale of subsidy by government and by the public and the cost required for inspection.

Key words: environmental NGO, enterprise, carbon emissions, three main-bodies game