考虑质量偏好的两阶段服务供应链质量控制策略

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0080

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究了一个集成商和一个提供商所组成的服务供应链的质量控制问题。考虑集成商的质量缺陷承诺和提供商的质量偏好,并将提供商的质量活动区分为质量改进和质量保持两个阶段,分别建立了服务供应链成员的效用函数,同时考虑服务供应链成员的竞争与合作,运用博弈理论,优化得到单阶段与两阶段时,集成商的最优服务价格和质量缺陷承诺,以及提供商的最优服务质量改进程度。最后,通过对比分析及数值仿真发现,考虑两阶段质量控制较单阶段情形,更有利于服务供应链较长期限内获得更多效用。其次,服务提供商质量偏好对服务供应链单阶段与两阶段下的最优效用和质量控制策略均产生一定影响。

关键词: 服务供应链, 质量改进, 质量偏好, 质量缺陷承诺, 质量控制

Abstract: Quality control strategies of a service supply chain containing an integrator and a provider are researched. Simultaneously, integrator’s quality defect warranty and provider’s quality preference are considered. We divide provider’s quality activities into two phases: quality improvement and quality maintaining. And we build utility functions of service supply chain members considering the relationship of competition and cooperation. Applying game theory, we obtain the optimal quality defect warranty and service price of the integrator as well as the optimal quality improvement of the provider under different phases. Finally, we find out that it can obtain the a better utility comparing two phases to single phase under a long time. For another, quality preference of the service provider has an impact on optimal utility and quality control strategy under different phases in service supply chain through contrastive analysis and numerical simulation.

Key words: service supply chain, quality improvement, quality preference, quality defect warranty, quality control

中图分类号:

C931

张翠华, 邢鹏, 王语霖. 考虑质量偏好的两阶段服务供应链质量控制策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(4): 37-46.

ZHANG Cui-hua, XING Peng, WANG Yu-lin. Quality Control Strategy Considering Quality Preference under Two Phases in Service Supply Chain[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(4): 37-46.

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