“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链“双向补贴”机制研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2018.0125

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于订单农业特点,构建“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链决策模型。研究发现,订单农业传统价格机制:按“固定价格”收购、按“市场价格”收购、“随行就市,保底收购”,各具优缺点,但均未能很好地协调此类“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链,我国订单农业违约率也是居高不下。为此,提出一种 “双向补贴”价格机制来协调此类订单农业供应链。本研究结果表明,“双向补贴”价格机制能够很好地弥补了按“固定价格”,“市场价格”收购的缺陷,保证了农户和公司获得相对稳定的收入,提高了“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链的稳定性。同时,实施该协调机制后,改善了公司在“随行就市,保底收购”机制下要承担全部风险的缺陷,公司和农户实现了“收益共享,风险同担”。

关键词: 供应链, 订单农业, 双向补贴机制

Abstract: Based on the characteristics of the contract farming, the paper establishes a model of agricultural supply chain for the company and the farmer. The traditional contract price terms of contract farming, such as, “fixed price”, “market price” and “protection price”, have some advantages and disadvantages. However, they can not coordinate the “company+farmer” type of contract-farming supply chain well. The contract-farming’s default rate is also high. To solve this problem, the new contract mechanism “two-way compensation” to coordinate the contract farming supply chain is proposed. The study suggests that the new contract mechanism “two-way compensation” can make up the deficiencies about the contract mechanism “fixed price” and “market price” and achieve relative stable revenues of both the company and farmer, so as to enhance the robustness of the“company+farmer” contract farming supply chain. At the same time, the implementation of the “two-way compensation” coordination mechanism can make up the defect of the “protection price” contract price term where the company has to take all risks and achieve the company and farmer “revenue sharing, risk taking”.

Key words: supply chains, contract-farming, two-way compensation

中图分类号:

F224.3

叶飞, 蔡子功. “公司+农户”型订单农业供应链“双向补贴”机制研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2018, 27(5): 186-193.

YE Fei , CAI Zi-gong. Research on “Company+Farmer” Contract Farming Supply Chain Decision Model with Two Way Compensation Mechanism[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2018, 27(5): 186-193.

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