关键词: 薪酬差距, 企业金融化, 代理行为, 内部控制, 审计委员会

Abstract: In order to explore whether the salary gap, an incentive factor, will help to alleviate the management excessive financialization, the paper first constructs a theoretical model to illustrate that there may be a U-shaped nonlinear relationship between the salary gap and the corporate financialization. Then, the article takes 16371 observation data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share during 2009~2017 as samples for empirical test. The research finds that there is a significant U-shaped nonlinear relationship between the salary gap and the corporate financialization. Too large and too small salary gap incentives will lead to managerment excessive financialization, which will result in the squeeze of enterprise innovation investment and the deviation of enterprise production essence. The further research shows that the U-shaped nonlinear relationship between the salary gap and the corporate financialization is mainly reflected in the enterprises with better corporate governance, such as low agency behavior, flawless internal control and audit committees. Meanwhile, though the enterprises with weak corporate governance, such as high agency behavior, defective internal controls and non-audit committees, have U-shaped nonlinear relationship, it is not significant.

Key words: salary gap, corporate financialization, agency behavior, internal control, audit committees