关键词: 闭环供应链, 股权融资, 损失规避, 需求不确定

Abstract: With resource scarcity and environmental degradation, how to balance economic and environmental benefit has become an important issue. The smooth operation of closed loop supply chains (CLSC) can solve these problems. However, the problem of retailer’s capital constraint in the CLSC always exits. The retailer can obtain capital support through external bank loans and internal equity financing. There are some literatures which have studied the operation decisions of CLSC, financing strategies in supply chain, and the impact of risk attitude on supply chain decisions. But the research on incorporating capital constraints and participants’ loss aversion into the CLSC is still relatively scarce. In addition, bank credit and trade credit are still considered as main financing modes in relative study, while the supply chain internal equity financing used commonly in reality is ignored. Based on this, this paper studies the green operation decisions of each participant under the external bank loans and internal manufacturer investment. Furthermore, this paper considers the impact of capital demanders’ loss aversion preference on financing mode selection. Thus, a three-level CLSC Stackelberg game model is established including a rational manufacturer, a capital constrained loss-averse retailer and a rational recycler.
In this model, we assume that the manufacturer is the highest leader, the recycler is the secondary leader, and the retailer is the follower. The model can be divided two stages. The first stage is the production and sales stage, where the retailer chooses the order quantity based on the wholesale price determined by the manufacturer. And then, facing the uncertain market demand the retailer will get sale profits. We assume that market demand follows a uniform distribution. In order to simplify the analysis, the unit retail price is standardized to 1. In this process, there is a capital gap for retailers, which can be resolved through two channels: Bank loans or accepting investment from manufacturers. At the end of this stage, the retailer needs to pay for the cost of financing. The second stage is the recycling and remanufacturing stage. The recycler recovers used products from consumers or retailers and then sells them to manufacturers for reproduction. The manufacturer can produce new products and remanufacture products which have the same qualities, and the production of remanufactured products can save costs. And the recycler must establish recycling networks and channels before carrying out recycling activities, and the cost is a quadratic function. The loss aversion utility function is used to describe the characteristics of loss aversion of retailers. Based on this model, the reverse induction method is used to obtain the optimal decisions of each party under different financing modes. Then, numerical simulation is used to obtain the impact of loss aversion behavior on financing and operational decisions.
The results show that financing costs have the same impact on the operating decisions of recyclers and retailers, but the opposite impact on manufacturers’ wholesale prices. Moreover, only the financing cost across a value threshold can help the retailer and investors realize their Pareto improvement. And the higher the loss aversion of the retailer, the larger the range of acceptable loan interest rates and the smaller the range of dividend ratios. When the negotiated dividend ratio is 0.05 and the loan interest rate is relatively small, the retailer prefers investment. In reality,recyclers may also face capital constraints and other parties may have different risk preferences. Thus, analyzing the impact of these factors on capital constrained CLSC is also worth in-depth research.

Key words: closed loop supply chain, equity financing, loss aversion, uncertain demand