运筹与管理 ›› 2023, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (9): 157-164.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2023.0299

• 应用研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

农地流转:固定收益模式vs.共享收益模式

顾波军, 钟小婷, 付雨芳   

  1. 浙江海洋大学 经济与管理学院,浙江 舟山 316022
  • 出版日期:2023-09-25 发布日期:2023-11-02
  • 通讯作者: 付雨芳(1987-),女,山西太原人,副教授,博士,研究方向:供应链管理。
  • 作者简介:顾波军(1980-),男,浙江舟山人,教授,博士,研究方向:农业经济管理,物流与供应链优化;钟小婷(1997-),女,江西赣州人,硕士研究生,研究方向:农林经济管理。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(19YJC630044,19YJC630035);浙江省教育厅资助项目(Y201840337)

Farmland Transfer: Fixed Revenue Mode vs. Revenue Sharing Mode

GU Bojun, ZHONG Xiaoting, FU Yufang   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Ocean University, Zhoushan 316022, China
  • Online:2023-09-25 Published:2023-11-02

摘要: 利益分配是农地流转的核心问题。本文以一个区域的农户和一个农产品种植企业为研究对象,以自愿流转为前提刻画农地流转意愿函数;进而分别构建固定收益模式与共享收益模式下两阶段农地流转博弈模型;并通过两种收益分配模式下最优决策以及收益的比较揭示不同利益分配方式对农地流转的影响机制;最后,本文结合农业生产数据运用数值算例对理论研究结果进行验证和说明。研究发现:无论农户是否共享农地流转后的经营性收益,本文所构建的农地流转博弈模型均存在唯一最优的均衡策略;相比于固定收益模式,以共享收益模式流转农地不仅能够降低流转价格、而且能够提高农户流转意愿;以固定收益模式为比较基础,存在帕累托改善区间,使得在共享收益模式下参与农地流转的种植企业和农户同时得到改善且维持政府处境不变;政府补贴完全资本化为农地流转价格,有助于提升农户期望收益,并且适当提高政府补贴幅度可以扩大共享收益模式的适用范围。

关键词: 农地流转, 农户农地流转意愿, 固定收益模式, 共享收益模式

Abstract: The fourteenth five-year (2021~2025) plan for national economic and social development of the People's Republic of China emphasizes giving priority to the development of agriculture and rural areas, and promoting the strategy of rural revitalization in an all-round way. Agricultural modernization is the basis of implementing the strategy of rural revitalization, and the development of moderate scale operation of agricultural land is an important path for the transformation from traditional agriculture to modern agriculture, and what's more, the farmland transfer is the premise of moderate scale operation of agricultural land. Therefore, under the realistic background of less land and more people in our country, changing the current situation of enrichment at both ends of urban service resources and rural agricultural land resources, and promoting the orderly circulation of agricultural land is an effective way to promote agricultural modernization and revitalize the countryside. However, the growth rate of the proportion of farmland transfer has slowed down gradually in recent years, the farmland transfer shows the phenomenon of “low circulation and high abandonment”, and the policy implementation falls into a state of “waste of resources” and inefficiency in some areas. There are many reasons for such a result, but benefit distribution is one of the core problems in farmland transfer. For farmers, the ancillary functions of agricultural land include economic income function, social security function and possible value-added income in thefuture. However, after the farmland transfer, the farmer fails to get normal income from farmland transfer. Therefore, how to optimize the benefit distribution mechanism among the subjects of agricultural land transfer and distribute the transfer income reasonably, so as to ensure that farmers increase their income and alleviate their dependence on the added value of agricultural land, has become an urgent problem to promote the orderly circulation of agricultural land and moderate scale management in our country.
This paper employs a willingness function to characterize the premise of farmers' voluntary to participate in farmland transfer and builds a Stackelberg game model between the farmers in a region and an agricultural product plantation company. Given that a farmland transfer system consists of the farmers in a region and an agricultural product plantation company, a willingness function of farmland transfer is depicted based on the premise of farmers' voluntary transfer. Then, two-stage game models of farmland transfer are established under the fixed revenue mode and revenue sharing mode, respectively. Moreover, the optimal decisions and revenue are compared under two modes of benefit distribution, so as to reveal the influence mechanism of different benefit distribution modes on farmland transfer. Finally, the theoretical results are verified and explained directly by numerical examples combined with the agricultural production data.
The main results suggest that: (1)There is an unique optimal equilibrium strategy for the two-stage game models of farmland transfer, regardless of whether or not the agricultural revenue is shared after the farmland is transferred. (2)Compared with the fixed revenue mode, it can not only reduce the transfer price, but also can increase the willingness to transfer under the revenue sharing mode. (3)Based on the fixed revenue mode, there is a Pareto improvement region in which both sides who participate in farmland transfer can get more benefits and the government's welfare remains unchanged under the revenue sharing mode. (4)The government subsidy is fully capitalized into the transfer price, which helps to raise the expected income of farmers. Moreover, the government can expand scope of application for the revenue sharing mode by increasing subsidy appropriately.
This paper has guiding significance for promoting the farmland transfer orderly and moderate scale operation of agricultural land. There are three management implications: (1)The revenue sharing model is a better benefit distribution mechanism of farmland transfer than the fixed revenue model. (2)The technical efficiency and cost efficiency of planting enterprises engaged in agricultural production are the fundamental guarantee for the realization of benefit distribution. (3) The establishment of reasonable and effective government subsidy is very important to promote the farmland transfer orderly.

Key words: farmland transfer, farmers' willingness of farmland transfer, fixed revenue mode, revenue sharing mode

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