基于代理成本的供应链利润分配研究

运筹与管理 ›› 2013, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (5): 51-61.

基于代理成本的供应链利润分配研究

黄梅萍^1,2, 汪贤裕²

1.福州大学土木工程学院,福建福州 350108;
2.四川大学商学院,四川成都 610064

收稿日期:2011-11-29 出版日期:2013-10-25
作者简介:黄梅萍(1982-),女,福建福州人,讲师,博士,研究方向为博弈论及供应链管理等;汪贤裕(1947-),男,江苏苏州人,教授、博士生导师,研究方向为管理科学、博弈论及供应链管理等。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071103);福州大学科研启动项目(XRC-1267);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(13YJC630053)

Profit Allocation of Supply Chain Based on Agency Costs

HUANG Mei-ping^1,2, WANG Xian-yu²

1. College of Civil Engineering, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China;
2. Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064, China

Received:2011-11-29 Online:2013-10-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对不对称信息带来的代理成本对供应链利润分配的影响,文章以委托代理理论和合作博弈为基本研究方法,引入虚拟第三方为利他的委托人,研究基于代理成本的供应链利润分配问题。结果表明:为了实现对供应商逆向选择的激励和销售商道德风险的激励,当虚拟第三方提供给供销双方的转移支付之和等于供应链总期望销售收入时,供销双方则得到自身预期的收益,否则,双方需在差额上进一步进行谈判协商,最后结合算例进行了分析论证。

关键词: 供应链, 双边不对称信息, 代理成本, 利润分配, 合作博弈

Abstract: To analyze the impact of agency costs caused by asymmetric information on the supply chain profit distribution, the virtual third party is introduced as a selfless principal based on the theory of principal agent and cooperative game. Then, the supply chain profit distribution is discussed on the of agency costs. The results show that: in order to reduce the adverse selection and the moral hazard, only when the sum of transfer payments for supplier and retailer is equal to the total expected sales, could they get their expected benefits. Otherwise, the new results might be got through further negotiation on the differential section. Finally, an example is given to illustrate the conclusion.

Key words: supply chain, bilateral asymmetric information, agency costs, profit allocation, cooperative game

中图分类号:

C931
F274

黄梅萍, 汪贤裕. 基于代理成本的供应链利润分配研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(5): 51-61.

HUANG Mei-ping, WANG Xian-yu. Profit Allocation of Supply Chain Based on Agency Costs[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2013, 22(5): 51-61.

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