关键词: 企业管理, 三阶段锦标激励, FS模型, 公平偏好, 拆台行为, 委托代理模型

Abstract: In order to solve the multi-agent incentives and the principal's moral hazard problems, based on fairness preferences, the paper builds three-period tournament incentives model and discusses the effect of fairness preferences and wage spreads on the agent's effort level and sabotage through the mathematical induction method. Then the paper compares agent's effort level of each stage under different promotion process. The results show that agent's effort level and sabotage change in the same way, and fairness preferences of agent reduce the agent's effort level and sabotage while wage spreads improve the agent's effort level and sabotage. And agent's effort level in the first period is always higher than it in the third period regardless of the promotion process. The paper expands the study of tournament incentives from the perspective of behavioral economics based on principal-agent model.

Key words: corporate management, three-period tournament incentives, FS model, fairness preferences, sabotage, principal-agent model