关键词: 公平关切, 店内推介, 信息不对称, Stackelberg动态博弈

Abstract: A referral strategy problem of the e-retail with fairness concern is studied. Firstly, we establish the e-retailer’ decision model without fairness concern, and we find that: the equilibrium strategy of the e-retailers is mutual referral in this benchmark. Secondly, we assume the follower (retailer 2) cares for the fairness, in the case of asymmetric information, as the follower’s fairness concern increases, the equilibrium referral strategy are no retailer referral, only the follower (retailer 2) referral and mutual referral in proper sequence, and due to the information asymmetry, fairness concern can induce the follower to adopt referral strategy; under symmetric information, the equilibrium referral strategy are only leader retailer (retailer 1) referral and mutual referral in proper sequence with the follower’s fairness concern increasing. The transparency of information can promote the leader retailer to take referral strategy. Finally, the problem of equilibrium referral strategy under the fair concern of both retailers is analyzed.

Key words: fairness concern, in-store referral, asymmetric information, Stackelberg dynamic game