运筹与管理 ›› 2024, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (9): 71-77.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2024.0287

• 理论分析与方法 • 上一篇    下一篇

直播电商模式下考虑政府补贴的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

苏百威, 郑琪   

  1. 上海工程技术大学 管理学院,上海 201620
  • 收稿日期:2022-05-10 出版日期:2024-09-25 发布日期:2024-12-31
  • 通讯作者: 郑琪(1988-),女,河南南阳人,博士,副教授,研究方向:供应链管理。
  • 作者简介:苏百威(1996-),男,内蒙古包头人,硕士研究生,研究方向:供应链管理
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71901141);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2018EGL010)

Supply Chain Coordination of Fresh Products with Government Subsidy in the Live-streaming E-commerce

SU Baiwei, ZHENG Qi   

  1. School of Management, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai 201620, China
  • Received:2022-05-10 Online:2024-09-25 Published:2024-12-31

摘要: 针对由一个生鲜农产品供应商和一个主播组成的供应链,考虑产品的保鲜努力和主播努力程度,建立政府补贴情形下的Stackelberg博弈模型,比较分析生鲜农产品价格需求弹性对供应链成员最优决策的影响,通过设计契约对供应链进行协调,并进一步研究了政府补贴对消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。研究表明:随着政府补贴系数的增加,主播的收益和努力程度逐渐提高,供应商的收益也得到提升,同时供应商会提高保鲜努力水平,但政府补贴并非一定会改善消费者剩余和社会福利水平。“收益共享-成本共担”契约能够实现政府补贴下的生鲜电商供应链协调,并提高消费者剩余和供应链上各成员的收益。政府对价格需求弹性较大的生鲜农产品进行补贴,能够提高消费者剩余;政府对价格需求弹性较小的生鲜农产品进行补贴,能够提升社会整体福利。

关键词: 生鲜农产品, 政府补贴, 直播电商, 契约协调

Abstract: With the development of economy and change in consumers' shopping mode, live broadcast with goods, as a new sales mode, can expand the sales channels of fresh agricultural products and improve the circulation speed of fresh agricultural products. The Chinese government attaches great importance to the live broadcasting and cargo carrying industry of agricultural products, and has issued a series of policies to promote the development of live broadcasting and cargo carrying industry of agricultural products in recent years. However, due to the freshness of fresh products and the flow of live fans, the efforts of product preservation and the live broadcast efforts of the host are important factors affecting the supply chain of fresh agricultural products under the live broadcast e-commerce, which greatly affects the circulation efficiency of fresh agricultural products under the live broadcast mode. Under the live broadcast e-commerce mode, there are still some problems, such as uneven income distribution among supply chain members and insufficient effectiveness of government subsidies. Therefore, how the government should implement the subsidy strategy to improve the level of consumer surplus and social welfare, and how the optimal decision-making of fresh agricultural products supply chain members will change when the government subsidies are adopted are practical problems that need to be studied and solved urgently.
In this paper, a Stackelberg game model is established for a supply chain composed of a fresh agricultural product supplier and an anchor, considering the freshness of fresh agricultural products, the price elasticity of product demand, and the efforts of the anchor of live broadcast e-commerce. Aiming at maximizing the profits and social welfare of the fresh agricultural product supply chain, the impact of government subsidies on the members of the supply chain will be analyzed when the price elasticity of fresh agricultural products is different. A “revenue sharing cost sharing” contract is designed to improve the profits of each member and the surplus of consumers, so as to achieve a win-win situation for all parties in the fresh agricultural product supply chain. Finally, supply chain coordination is achieved by using the supply chain contract theory, and the impact of government subsidies on consumer surplus and social welfare is further studied. The decision-making of government subsidies for anchors under the live broadcast mode is discussed, and the forms of subsidies for fresh agricultural products with different price elasticity of demand are analyzed. This provides a theoretical basis for the choice of government subsidy strategy.
Our results show that: (1)Under the government subsidy mode, anchors will improve their efforts to obtain subsidies, and the number of anchor fans will increase synchronously. Although suppliers do not receive subsidies directly, their income will also increase with an increase in government subsidy coefficient. At the same time, suppliers will also improve the fresh-keeping efforts of fresh agricultural products. (2)Compared with the model without government subsidies, government subsidies under decentralized decision-making do not necessarily improve the income of supply chain members, the level of consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, when the government subsidizes fresh agricultural products with greater price elasticity, this can improve the profits of supply chain members and consumer surplus, but will reduce the overall social welfare. (3)The “revenue sharing cost sharing” contract can effectively coordinate the fresh e-commerce supply chain, and improve the consumer surplus and the profits of supply chain members. (4)Government subsidies for fresh agricultural products with large price elasticity can increase consumer surplus. Government subsidies for freshagricultural products with small price elasticity of demand can improve the overall welfare of society. Therefore, when the government subsidizes fresh agricultural products, it should consider the impact of price demand elasticity of agricultural products on the subsidy effect.

Key words: fresh products, government subsidy, livestream e-commerce, contract coordination

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