基于合作博弈的移动支付商业模式动态联盟企业利益分配研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0159

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 移动支付是近年来的热门发展方向,但是目前我国还没有形成统一的移动支付商业模式,已有研究没有量化各参与主体的价值贡献,导致利益分配产生冲突。针对这一问题,采用合作博弈理论系统分析通信运营商、金融机构、第三方支付平台在移动支付商业模式中的价值贡献,在基于Shapley值法量化的基础上引入资源投入、风险分担、创新能力三要素进行改进,计算得到各参与主体在合作联盟中的综合量化值。研究结果表明,将改进的Shapley值法应用于移动支付商业模式利益分配研究更能体现公平性和科学性,为解决各参与主体合作冲突、构建协同创新与利益共享的移动支付商业模式提供理论借鉴与参考。

关键词: 移动支付, 商业模式, 合作博弈, 价值贡献, 协同创新, 利益分配, Shapley值

Abstract: Mobile payment is a popular development direction in recent years, but our country has not formed a unified business model at present. Previous studies have not quantified the value contribution among each participant and led to conflicts in benefit distribution. To solve the above problem, cooperative game theory is adopted to study the value contribution of communications operators, financial institutions and the third-party payment platforms in mobile payment business model, and resource investment, risk sharing, innovation ability are advanced to quantify the contribution of different participants based on Shapley value method and finally we get the comprehensive quantitative value of each participant in cooperation alliance. The result shows that the application of the modified Shapley value method is fairer and more scientific in benefit distribution of mobile payment business model; it can provide a theory reference for solving cooperative conflict, the construction of collaborative innovation and revenue sharing mobile payment business model.

Key words: mobile payment, business model, cooperative game, value contribution, collaborative innovation, benefit distribution, Shapley-value theory

中图分类号:

F724

王选飞, 吴应良, 黄媛. 基于合作博弈的移动支付商业模式动态联盟企业利益分配研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(7): 29-38.

WANG Xuan-fei, WU Ying-liang, HUANG Yuan. Research on the Benefit Distribution of Dynamic Alliance EnterpriseMobile Payment Business Model Based on Cooperative Game[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(7): 29-38.

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