关键词: 信息泄露, 供应链, 批发价格合约, 收益共享合约

Abstract: Information leakage is one of the barriers to information sharing among supply chain members. In this paper, we study information leakage issue within an upstream supplier and two competing downstream retailers-the incumbent and the entrant. Considering the long-term cooperative relationship between the supplier and the incumbent, we assume they are linked by a revenue sharing contract. Since the entrant just enters the market, the supplier offers him a wholesale price contract. By using signaling game framework, we analyze the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this setting, and provide the conditions for separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium and non-leakage equilibrium. The study finds that the supplier has incentive to withhold the information from the incumbent if the revenue sharing rate and the wholesale price satisfy certain condition. Finally, we compare the incumbent, the entrant and the supplier’s equilibrium profits in separating and non-leakage equilibrium via numerical examples.

Key words: information leakage, supply chain, wholesale price contract, revenue sharing contract