关键词: 政府奖惩, 合作减排, 低碳宣传, 微分博弈

Abstract: In order to reduce the adverse impact of carbon emissions on the environment during production, the premium and penalty of government on the manufacturer is taken into account. In this context, aimed at solving the problem of long-term cooperation on carbon emission reduction and low-carbon propaganda in a supply chain, the differential game model is constructed. It is considered that products' demand is influenced by both carbon emissions and retailers' low-carbon propaganda efforts. This paper obtains and analyzes the manufacturer's and retailer's feedback equilibrium strategies, and optimal trajectories of products' carbon emissions in the decentralized and centralized decision-making. It is found that the optimal trajectories of products' carbon emissions have a variety of convergence and divergence, and the win-win of the supply chain's profit and environmental performance can be achieved in the centralized decision-making. In addition, the impact of premium and penalty strength of government on the products' carbon emissions is analyzed. At last, the model is analyzed by the numerical simulation, which provides a theoretical reference for the low-carbon management of supply chain and the formulation of the premium and penalty policy of government.

Key words: premium and penalty of government, cooperation on carbon emission reduction, low-carbon propaganda, differential game