关键词: 供应链, 供应链商誉, 低碳经济, 微分博弈, 成本分担

Abstract: In the context of low carbon economy, considering the different ways of government participation, this paper studies the dynamic game problem of medium and long term supply chain cooperation(emission reduction by upstream manufacturers and publicity by downstream retailers)to improve the low carbon reputation of supply chain by differential game. A decentralized decision-making model without government subsidies, a decentralized decision-making model with government subsidies, a centralized decision-making model with government subsidies, and a two-way cost sharing contract model under government intervention are constructed and analyzed. The research shows that in the latter three cases, the supply chain low-carbon reputation, manufacturers' emission reduction efforts and retailers' low-carbon publicity efforts have the same level, and all of them are higher than the situation of non-government subsidies; under government intervention, the government does not need to provide subsidies, but can achieve the effect of subsidies; both the government and manufacturers with higher game status in the supply chain prefer to adopt the two-way cost-sharing contract mode under government intervention, while the retailers with lower game status in the supply chain are more willing to accept the decentralized decision-making mode with government subsidies; The government should take full account of the comparison of enterprise marginal profit in the supply chain when choosing the way of participation. Finally, the models are analyzed by numerical examples.

Key words: supply chain, supply chain reputation, low carbon economy, differential game, cost-sharing