生产者对回收责任约束的参与意愿——强制性与自愿性的形成机理及驱动因素分析

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0082

运筹与管理 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 229-235.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0082

生产者对回收责任约束的参与意愿——强制性与自愿性的形成机理及驱动因素分析

杨丽¹, 李帮义², 徐广姝¹

1. 北京物资学院物流学院,北京 101149;
2. 南京航天航空大学经济与管理学院,南京江宁 211106

收稿日期:2018-12-17 出版日期:2020-03-25
作者简介:杨丽(1978-), 女, 山西长治人, 副教授, 博士, 研究方向:决策优化、企业社会责任管理、供应链管理;李帮义(1963-), 男, 山东邹平人, 教授, 博士, 博导, 研究方向:供应链建模与优化;徐广姝(1975-), 女, 长春人, 教授, 博士, 研究方向:生鲜农产品供应链管理。
基金资助:
北京市教委人文社科计划面上课题(SQSM201510037006);北京物资学院高级别项目培育基金(GJB20155003);国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(13AZD062)

Producers' Participation Willingness of Recovering Responsibility ——Analysis of Formation Mechanism and Driving Factor of the Mandatory and Voluntary

YANG Li¹, LI Bang-yi², XU Guang-shu¹

1. School of Logistics, Beijing Wu Zi University, Beijing, 101149, China;
2. College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, 211106, China

Received:2018-12-17 Online:2020-03-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 绿色发展要求生产者承担回收、循环并再利用的延伸责任。政府通过合规计划约束生产者的行为,规制水平与获利驱动调控生产者的参与意愿而实现回收责任。本文以再制造作为废旧产品的价值恢复模式,导入了循环环节的环境成本,构建了基于经济效益和经济效益与环境效益相统一的生产者参与意愿决策模型,运用线性约束二次规划的K-T条件方法,确立了两种情境下的最优决策。研究结果给出了生产者强制性与自愿性的分型边界,分型边界受恢复价值和政府规制水平的联合驱动;评估了环境成本结构对强制性/自愿性的分型边界、效益的影响。

关键词: 生产者延伸责任, 强制性与自愿性, 再制造, 参与意愿

Abstract: Green development requires producers to hold extended responsibility for recovering, recycling and reusing. The government restricts producers' behavior through compliance programs, and the level of regulation and profit-driven regulation of producers' willingness to participate in achieving recycling responsibility. This paper takes remanufacturing as the value recovery model of waste products, introduces the environmental cost of the loop link, and constructs a producer participation decision-making model based on the economic benefits and environmental benefits. The K-T condition of linear constrained quadratic programming is used. The method establishes the optimal decision in two scenarios. The results show the classification boundary of the mandatory and voluntary of producers. The classification boundary is driven by the combination of recovery value and government regulation level. The impact of environmental cost structure on mandatory/voluntary classification boundaries and benefits is evaluated.

Key words: extended producer responsibility, the mandatory and voluntary, remanufacturing, participation willingness

中图分类号:

F253

杨丽, 李帮义, 徐广姝. 生产者对回收责任约束的参与意愿——强制性与自愿性的形成机理及驱动因素分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(3): 229-235.

YANG Li, LI Bang-yi, XU Guang-shu. Producers' Participation Willingness of Recovering Responsibility ——Analysis of Formation Mechanism and Driving Factor of the Mandatory and Voluntary[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(3): 229-235.

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生产者对回收责任约束的参与意愿——强制性与自愿性的形成机理及驱动因素分析

Producers' Participation Willingness of Recovering Responsibility ——Analysis of Formation Mechanism and Driving Factor of the Mandatory and Voluntary

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