Vender Managed Inventory Model Considering Supplier's Fairness Preference in Supply Chain with Dominant Retailer

Abstract

Abstract: By making an introduction of fairness preference into the traditional VMI model, the mechanism is discussed of how fairness preference impacts the performance of supply chain. Boundary conditions of fairness preference are revealed by establishing a Stackelberg gaming model. It is pointed out that 1)there's a ‘price threshold', and when sales price is higher(lower)than the threshold, supplier will(won't)have fairness negative utility; 2)the value of ‘price threshold' has a positive correlation with retailer's channel power;3)when sales price is higher than the ‘price threshold', fairness negative utility will firstly get higher and then lower as the supplier has an increasing degree of jealousy; 4)fairness preference aggravates the double marginal effect in the supply chain. Finally, the effectiveness of conclusions has been verified by numerical examples.

Key words: supply chain management, fairness preference, Stackelberg gaming, VMI mode

摘要： 将公平偏好引入传统VMI模型之中,探讨供应商的公平偏好对供应链各成员及整体产生影响的机理。通过建立主导零售商与供应商间的Stackelberg博弈,揭示了公平偏好起作用的边界条件,研究指出:1)存在一个价格阀值,使得当产品的销售价格高于(低于)该阀值时,供应商产生(不产生)公平负效用;2)阀值的高低与零售商的渠道力量呈正相关关系;3)当销售价格高于阀值时,供应商的公平负效用会随自身嫉妒心理强度的增强而先减小后变大;4)供应商的公平偏好会加剧供应链内的双重边际效应。最后,数值分析验证了结论的有效性。

关键词: 供应链管理, 公平偏好, Stackelberg博弈, VMI模式

CLC Number:

F274

ZHAO Dao-zhi, LV Xin. Vender Managed Inventory Model Considering Supplier's Fairness Preference in Supply Chain with Dominant Retailer[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2013, 22(3): 45-52.

赵道致, 吕昕. 零售商主导供应链中考虑供应商公平偏好的VMI模型[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(3): 45-52.

References

[1] Lee H, Padmanabhan V, Whang S. The bullwhip effect in supply chain[J]. Sloan Management Review, 1997, 38(3): 93-102.
[2] Waller M, Johnson M E, Davis T. Vendor-managed inventory in the retail supply chain[J]. Journal of Business Logisties, 1999, 20(1): 183-203.
[3] Magee J F. Production planning and inventory control[M]. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958.
[4] Andel T. Manage inventory, own information[J]. Transportation and Distribution, 1996, 37(5): 54-58.
[5] Lee H L, Padmanabhan V, Whang S. Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect[J]. Management Science, 1997, 43(4): 546-558.
[6] Chen F, Drezner Z, Ryan J K, et al. Quantifying the bullwhip effect in a supply chain: the effect of forecasting, lead times and information[J]. Management Science, 2000, 46(3): 436-443.
[7] Bernstein F, Chen F, Federgruen A. Coordinating supply chains with simple pricing schemes: the role of vendor-managed inventories[J]. Management Science, 2006, 52(10): 1483-1492.
[8] Yan D, Xu K. A supply chain model of vendor managed inventory[J]. Transportation Research Part E, 2002, 38: 75-95.
[9] Wang Y Z, Jia L, Shen Z J. Channel performance under consignment contract with revenue sharing[J]. Management Science, 2004, 50(4): 34-47.
[10] 区伟明,胡奇英,马杰.供应能力制约下的VMI策略及其信息价值研究[J].系统工程学报,2006,21(4):393-397.
[11] 蔡建湖,黄卫来,程海芳.单供应商面对具有多个销售点的零售商时的VMI模型研究[J].工业工程与管理,2005,5:56-60.
[12] 蔡建湖,周根贵,黄卫来.VMI下的两级供应链库存决策模型研究[J].管理科学学报,2008,11(4):104-111.
[13] Mishra B K, Raghunathan S. Retailer-vs. Vendor-managed inventory and brand competition[J]. Management Science, 2004, 50(4): 445-457.
[14] Cachon G P. Supply chain coordination with contracts[M]. Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science: Supply Chain Management. North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2003: 229-339.
[15] Frazier G L. Interorganizational exchange behavior in marketing channels: a broadened perspective[J]. The Journal of Marketing, 1983, 47(4): 68-78.
[16] Kumar N, Scheer L, Steenkamp J. The effects of supplier fairness on vulnerable resellers[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1992, 29(1):18-34.
[17] Ho T, Zhang J. Designing pricing contracts for boundedly rational customers: does the framing of the fixed fee matter[J]. Management Science, 2008, 54(4): 686-700.
[18] Fehr E, Schmidt K M. A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114(3): 817-868.
[19] Rabin M. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics[J]. The American Economic review, 1993, 83(5): 1281-1302.
[20] Bolton G E, Ockenfels A. ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition[J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 100(20): 166-193.
[21] Cui T H, Raju J S, Zhang Z J. Fairness and channel coordination[J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(8): 1303-1314.
[22] Demirag O, Chen Y, Li J. Channel coordination under fairness concerns and nonlinear demand[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 207(3): 1321-1326.
[23] 杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,刘天卓.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[24] 马利军.具有公平偏好成员的两阶段供应链分析[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(2):37-43.
[25] 邢伟,汪寿阳,赵秋红,华国伟.考虑渠道公平的双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(7):1250-1256.
[26] 肖玉明.考虑利润分配公平性的供应链激励模型[J].预测,2009,28(1):42-47.
[27] 张志清,董绍辉,西宝,田丽娜.需求信息泄露条件下供应链零售商订货策略研究[J].运筹与管理,2010,2(19):80-88.
[28] Yao D, Yue X, Liu J. Vertical cost information sharing in a supply chain with value-adding retailers[J]. Omega, 2008, 5(36): 838-851.