Research on Supply Chain Incentive Contract with an Overconfident Retailer Under Information Asymmetry

Abstract

Abstract: We use the principal-agent model obtaining the optimal franchise fee contract in distribution supply chain with an overconfident retailer and a rational manufacturer, under information symmetry and information asymmetry, which denotes the effort level can't be monitored in both cases. The impact of retailer's overconfidence in his effort and manufacturer profits are investigated. From the comparison we find that under information asymmetry the retailer's effort level and the profits of the manufacturers are less than those under information symmetry,and the difference is inversely proportional to the degree of the retailer's overconfidence. Retailer's overconfidence can reduce the impact of information asymmetry; the manufacturer prefer to cooperate with the retailer who has higher degree of overconfidence.

Key words: supply chain management, information asymmetry, principal-agent model, overconfidence

摘要： 在有过度自信零售商的分销供应链中,利用委托代理模型分别得出了信息对称及信息不对称时(努力程度无法监控)的最优特许经营费契约。探究了在两种情况下,零售商过度自信程度对其努力程度及制造商利润的影响。从比较中得知信息不对称下零售商的努力程度及制造商利润都小于信息对称下的情况,两种差别分别与零售商的过度自信程度成反比。零售商的过度自信行为有正面的信息价值,能减少信息不对称的影响;制造商偏爱过度自信程度较高的零售商。

关键词: 供应链管理, 信息不对称, 委托代理, 过度自信

CLC Number:

F272

XU Yu-fa, LIU Zhe-rui, WANG Hai-juan. Research on Supply Chain Incentive Contract with an Overconfident Retailer Under Information Asymmetry[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(3): 113-118.

徐玉发, 刘哲睿, 王海娟. 信息不对称下具有过度自信零售商的供应链激励契约研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(3): 113-118.

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