Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2014, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (3): 119-126.

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Research on the Discriminatory Pricing Game Model of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Remanufacturing with Government Restrictions

ZHANG Shu-hong1, CHU Ye-ping2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Hubei University, Wuhan, 430062, China;
    2. Research Center of Hubei Logistics Development, Hubei University Key Institute of Humanities and Social Science, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan 430205, China
  • Received:2012-05-07 Online:2014-03-25

考虑政府约束的再制造闭环供应链差别定价博弈模型

张曙红1, 初叶萍2   

  1. 1.湖北大学 商学院,湖北 武汉 430062;
    2.湖北省人文社科重点研究基地 湖北物流发展研究中心,湖北经济学院,湖北 武汉 430205
  • 作者简介:张曙红(1974-),男,湖北省红安人,教授,博士,研究方向:再制造、可持续供应链管理。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学青年项目(12YJC630292);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171152)

Abstract: For a kind of closed-loop supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper establishes a discriminatory pricing decision model of closed-loop supply chain based on remanufacturing, considering the government reward and punishment restrictions for recycling of discarded products. The concentrated and decentralized discriminatory pricing strategies are studied based on game theory method, and the profits of closed-loop supply chain member enterprises are obtained, and a revenue-sharing supply chain coordination pricing contract is presented. Then the government restriction influence on the operation of closed-loop supply chain is analyzed.The research results show that the efficiency of closed-loop supply chain based on concentrated pricing decision is higher than the efficiency based on Stackelberg game decentralized pricing decision, and the coordination pricing contract can achieve the coordination of closed-loop supply chain. Furthermore, the priority condition of remanufacturing on which the profit of remanufacturing process is higher than manufacturing process are analyzed. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the models.

Key words: remanufacturing, closed-loop supply chain, government restriction, game theory, pricing strategy

摘要: 本文考虑政府对废弃产品回收的奖惩约束措施,针对一类由制造商、零售商构成的再制造闭环供应链系统,基于博弈论方法研究了新产品和再制造品存在定价差别时集中决策和分散决策模式下的定价策略,得出了闭环供应链成员的最优定价策略和利润,并分析了政府约束措施对闭环供应链运作的影响。研究表明:集中决策下供应链效率高于Stackelberg博弈分散决策,为此设计了一个收益共享协调定价契约实现了闭环供应链的协调,进而分析了政府回收约束情况下再制造过程利润超过制造过程的再制造优先条件。算例分析验证了定价策略及协调机制的有效性。

关键词: 再制造, 闭环供应链, 政府约束, 博弈论, 定价策略

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