Abstract: In the technology innovation network consisting of small and medium enterprises, whether the firm participates in technology innovation or not, and its ratio of participation, have a heavy effect on the whole network of technology innovation. Taking the small and macro firm as an example, this paper analyzes the revenue in terms of the participation for both, one or none of them while innovating simultaneously or alternatively, and how the order and the ratio of participation affect the stability of the technology innovation network based on the evolutionary game theory. The conditions of the technology innovation evolution are also pointed out. The conclusions are beneficial for the network of technology innovation of small and medium enterprises and its management as well.

Key words: innovation management, technology innovation, evolutionary network, game theory, small and medium enterprises

摘要： 在中小企业技术创新网络中,企业是否参加技术创新及其参与比例直接影响企业网络整体的技术创新。本文以技术创新网络中的小型企业和微型企业为例,建模博弈分析同时或先后技术创新情形下,二者都开展技术创新、只有一个企业技术创新或者都不创新时的收益,随后运用进化博弈理论分析企业参与技术创新的顺序及其比例如何影响网络技术创新的稳定性,指出了企业技术创新网络演进的条件。这一结论对于认识中小企业技术创新网络及其网络技术创新管理具有一定的意义。

关键词: 创新管理, 技术创新, 演化网络, 博弈论, 中小企业