Abstract: Constructing a duopoly model of licensing with endogenous cost-reducing innovation in horizontal difference, we compare profit, consumer surplus, social welfare and degree of technology innovation under different patterns of licensing. It is found that the patent holder will always increase its profit through two-part tariff or royalties. Royalties can yield the optimal profit while fixed-fee may lead to profit loss. Consumer surplus and social welfare are maximized under the regime of fixed-fee compared with two-part tariff and royalties. The degree of innovation depends on the pattern of licensing and the degree of substitution between the goods. No matter what the degree of substitution is, two-part tariff can achieve the highest degree of innovation.

Key words: management science, licensing, cournort competition, endogenous technology innovation, social welfare

摘要： 在具有水平差异且进行古诺竞争的双寡头结构中考虑技术拥有企业内生决定降低成本技术的创新程度,分析不同授权方式下技术拥有者利润、消费者剩余以及社会总福利的变化,并对不同授权方式下的技术创新程度进行比较。研究表明:技术拥有者通过双重收费、特许权收费方式总能实现利润增加,且双重收费方式能带来最大利润,而固定收费方式可能降低其利润;固定收费方式下消费者剩余、社会总福利高于双重收费,更高于特许权收费方式;技术创新程度与技术授权方式以及产品替代程度有关,且无论产品的替代程度如何,双重收费方式下的技术创新程度达到最大。

关键词: 管理科学, 技术授权, 古诺竞争博弈, 内生技术创新, 社会福利