Abstract: The principal-agent sales model is an important method that facilitates capital flow, product promotion, and market expansion, but it also carries certain risks. As the principal, the manufacturer is in a relatively poor position in information grasp. After signing the contract with the agent, it can not fully supervise the agent's effort, which is prone to the moral hazard problem. This will increase the labor cost, affect the product pricing, and endanger the manufacturer's profits and consumers' interests. Therefore, in the case of information asymmetry, how to design sales contracts and optimize pricing to maximize the principal's profits is a problem worth studying. Considering that the manufacturer provides commission sales contract to the agent, this paper studies the principal-agent model between the manufacturer and the agent. We analyze the impact of asymmetric information on the design of sales contracts and optimal pricing of the manufacturer. The contribution of this paper is as follows: On the one hand, we combine the design of sales contracts and product pricing problem, comprehensively consider the impact of the agent's efforts and price on product sales, and maximize the profit of the manufacturer by optimizing commissions and price. On the other hand, we consider the asymmetric information factors between the manufacturer and the agent, and study the effects of asymmetric information on the sales contract and expected profit, so as to provide suggestions for the manufacturer to encourage the agent to make efforts.
The analysis leads to the following conclusions. Firstly, we find that the optimal pricing is affected by the probability of high demand and the agent's effort cost. If the probability of high demand is large, the manufacturer will give up the low market demand and set a higher price to maximize profits. In this case, the effort cost will not affect the product pricing. However, if the probability of high demand is small and the effort cost is high, the manufacturer will set a lower price to take into account different demand levels. Besides, the manufacturer will give up incentive for the agent due to the high effort cost, which leads to a decrease in the probability of realizing high market demand and lowering the product price. Secondly, we have shown that asymmetric information increases the agent's commission and expected compensation and reduces the manufacturer's expected profit, but has no effect on the optimal pricing. In the case of asymmetric information, the agent has the information advantage, and the manufacturer needs to pay a higher commission than that in the case of the symmetric information to motivate the agent to make efforts. Under the condition of the constant agent's effort cost, the agent will get more compensation under the asymmetric information, while the manufacturer's expected profit is reduced. Since the agent's effort level only affects the probability of high demand realization, but has nothing to do with the market demand realization value, and if the manufacturer gives incentives to the agent to make efforts, the extra compensation will not affect the product price under asymmetric information. Finally, this study has found that the range of acceptable effort cost for the manufacturer becomes narrower in the case of asymmetric information, and the manufacturer inclines to set a lower price. If the agent's effort cost is high, the manufacturer will give up the incentive to the agent, and pay the agent zero compensation to obtain a low and stable expected profit. Under the condition of asymmetric information, the manufacturer's expected profit is lower than that under the condition of symmetric information, and then it is easier to reach the minimum expected profit threshold. Therefore, the manufacturer's acceptable effort cost range is narrower than that under the condition of symmetric information, and the manufacturer prefers to set a lower price.
The above conclusions provide a reference for the manufacturer to optimize product pricing and deal with the sales contract with the agent. Firstly, the manufacturer should constantly improve the incentive system to improve the competitiveness of compensation and strengthen the cooperation with agents. Secondly, the manufacturer should pay more attention to the market demand fluctuation, and take into account the agents' efforts to set a reasonable price. Finally, the manufacturer should use information means to eliminate the information asymmetry with the agent as far as possible to reduce the information rent. This paper mainly considers the commission compensation scheme. Moreover, we consider to expand the research to other compensation schemes and compare the impacts of different compensation schemes on the manufacturer' profits.

Key words: principal-agent model, asymmetric information, incentive contract, product pricing, commission payment

摘要： 代理商销售模式下,不对称信息对制造商产品定价与销售合同设计的影响越来越不容忽视。本文基于委托代理模型,分别构建了两种信息情况下提成制激励合同模型,对比分析了信息不对称下产品定价与代理商提成的关系,以及信息不对称对代理商收益、制造商利润的影响。研究发现,制造商最优定价与高需求实现概率和努力成本密切相关,当高需求市场实现概率较小且努力成本较高时,制造商将放弃对代理商的激励,并设定较低产品价格。当制造商激励代理商努力时,不对称信息有利于提高代理商期望收益,但会降低制造商期望利润,不影响价格高低。此外,不对称信息会缩小制造商可接受的努力成本区间,当代理商努力成本较大时,制造商会因薪酬支出过高而放弃对代理商的激励,而不对称信息使得代理商薪酬进一步提高,使得制造商更倾向于不激励代理商努力,相应定价也随之降低。

关键词: 委托代理, 不对称信息, 激励合同, 产品定价, 提成制