Abstract: In a two-echelon distribution supply chains formed by a single supplier and three competing retailers, we analyze the pricing game between supplier and different retailer coalitions using the concept of myopic Nash stability and farsighted largest consistent set(LCS)in cooperative game theory, then respectively analyze the stability of the retailers' coalition under three different Game theoretic framework. We found that, whoever the leader is, when the competition intensity is low, farsighted retailers are likely to form grand coalition although the grand coalition is not a stable structure for myopic retailers, and when the competition intensity is strong, then both the myopic retailers and farsighted retailers view the grand coalition as the stable structure. However, in the supplier-leading market structure, the threshold value of the coalition formed by farsighted retailers is higher; and in the market structure that suppliers and retailers are in the same position, grand coalition is the common stable structure both for myopic retailers and farsighted retailers.

Key words: distribution supply chains, cooperative game, myopic retailers, farsighted retailers

摘要： 针对由单一供应商和三个相互竞争零售商组成的两层分销供应链系统,在三种不同的博弈框架下,采用合作博弈论中短视的Nash稳定性概念与远视的最大一致集(LCS)概念研究了供应商与不同零售商联盟间的定价博弈,分别讨论了不同类型零售商联盟的稳定性。发现不论是在供应商处于领导地位,还是在零售商处于领导地位的市场中,当竞争强度较弱时,大联盟不是短视零售商联盟的稳定结构,却有可能是远视零售商联盟的稳定结构;当竞争强度较强时,则无论是短视零售商还是远视零售商都以大联盟为稳定结构,但是,在供应商处于领导地位的市场中,远视零售商形成大联盟的阈值较高;在供应商和零售商地位相同的市场中,大联盟则是远视零售商和短视零售商共同的稳定结构。

关键词: 分销供应链, 合作博弈, 短视零售商, 远视零售商