关键词: 供应链网络, 碳排放税, 成员企业行为, 网络均衡

Abstract: This paper studies the behavioral response of member firms in the supply chain network to carbon emission tax policy, and the competition and interactive behaviors among these member firms in the network under the policy, aiming at providing decision-making basis for environmental departments to design carbon emission tax policy. The general framework that we develop allows for three distinct types of carbon taxation decision scheme: decentralized scheme, a centralized scheme which assumes a fixed bound, a centralized scheme which allows the bound to be a function of the tax. Along with the three taxation schemes, the change of member firms’ profits and interactive behaviors of those will be studied. The equilibrium conditions of member firms are given, and are transformed into variational inequalities. We develop the game models of member firms in supply chain network under carbon emission tax policy, and present solution method of the models based on Euler method. Finally, the developed model is applied to numerical examples, and the equilibrium results are tompiled and discussed. The reactions including production decision, distribution decision, and carbon emission are analyzed. We study how government adjusts carbon emission tax to obtain desired environmental goal properly. Meanwhile, according to the equilibrium results for economical indicators of firms under different scheme and bound, how government also should know how to adjust the environmental goal of carbon emission.

Key words: supply chain network, carbon emission tax, the behavior of member firms, network equilibrium