关键词: 显著性理论, 价格——质量竞争, Hotelling模型

Abstract: Consumers have different preferences for different attributes of products, and have salient thinking behaviors. This paper uses the salience theory to study the optimal quality and price decisions of duopoly firms when there are two types of consumers with different sensitivity to quality and price in the market. The salience theory model is introduced into the classic Hotelling model to construct the utility function of consumers, the demand function and profit function when firms implement uniform pricing and discrimination pricing are obtained respectively. We analyze the impact of consumers' salient thinking behavior on the optimal profit when the firms implement the two strategies, and formulate the optimal equilibrium price-quality strategy for the two firms. The results show that the game equilibrium results of the two firms in different scenarios are to adopt the same strategy, and there is an optimal degree of consumers' salient thinking; that under the discrimination pricing strategy, firms set high prices for quality-sensitive consumers and low prices for price-sensitive consumers; that discrimination pricing strategy are better than uniform pricing strategy in most situations.

Key words: salience theory, price-quality competition, Hotelling model