关键词: 搜索-匹配, 博弈论, 在线平台, 定价, 服务策略

Abstract: Based on the two-sided market theory and utility theory, the‘search-match' decision of two types of users, the H-type user and the L-type user, with matching needs, as well as the service strategy and pricing strategy of the online platform are discussed and analyzed by constructing a game-theoretic model. In particular, we discuss and analyze the Nash equilibriums under four scenarios when the online platform provides the searching services firstly. All utility functions of two type users are listed and the equilibrium results are calculated, and by comparing the optimal profits of two types of users, their decisions on whether to use the online platform to search matchers and what conditions are to use the online platform are explored. In addition, with the similar research method, we also discuss the online platform's optimal service and pricing decisions when it provides ‘searching and authenticating' services at the same time.
The research finds that: (1)When the online platform only provides search services, the optimal service strategy of the online platform is jointly affected by the market structure, the ratio of the H-type users in the whole market, the quality difference between the two types of users. When the proportion of H-type users in the market is high and the difference between the two types of users is large, the optimal strategy of the online platform is to provide search services for H-type users by increasing the price of search services. Otherwise, it is the optimal strategy for the online platform to reduce the search pricing and provide the search services to the whole market. (2)When the online platform provides ‘search and authentication' services at the same time, the online platform's pricing and service strategies will also be affected by the market structure and the difference in the quality of the two types of users. In particular, when the price of the platform search service is low, both types of users will choose the online mode to carry out ‘search-match' process, but only H-type users will choose to purchase the authentication service when the price is low. With the improvement of market construction and the rise in the ratio of H-type users, the willingness of H-type users to purchase authentication services has gradually declined, and the pricing of search services and the pricing of authentication services will change in opposite directions. Furthermore, no matter how low the pricing of platform authentication services is, L-type users will not purchase them. (3)In addition, through the example analysis, we furtherly explore the relationships among the optimal pricing of searching, the optimal pricing of authentication, the market structure and the difference in two type users. The impact of market structure on the revenue of online platform is also analyzed by the example analysis. The research also finds that the online platform should pay more attention to the control of the cost of the authentication service when providing it, and the cost of the authentication service should be controlled within a specific range, otherwise, the online platform not only will be unable to profit from theauthentication service, but also may lose profits from the search services.
In a word, this paper expands the usage field of the two-sided market theory, provides a new perspective for the pricing and service strategies of online platforms, and also provides a theoretical support for the effective formulation and improvement of online platform operating policies.

Key words: search-match, game theory, online platform, pricing, service strategy