低碳供应链纵向减排合作下的政府补贴策略

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了研究低碳供应链减排合作的政府补贴问题,分别构建了在纳什博弈、斯塔克尔伯格博弈和供应链集中决策三种不同的博弈关系下,政府对制造商和零售商合作减排投入进行补贴的博弈模型。分析了企业的最优减排成本投入和政府的最优补贴率,并进一步讨论了政府补贴行为和企业选择减排合作行为之间的互动博弈。研究显示:政府提供的减排补贴和企业的收益随着供应链上下游合作的紧密程度不同而不同,在纳什博弈下最高,在集中决策下最低,斯塔克尔伯格博弈下介于两者之间。比较了力量不对等供应链中企业分别处于领导者和跟随者时获得的政府补贴的差异。同时在政府补贴行为和供应链企业合作行为的交互博弈中,政府的最优策略是不对任何一方实行减排补贴。

关键词: 低碳供应链, 减排合作, 政府补贴, 博弈论

Abstract: To study the governmental subsidy policy in abatement cooperation in supply chain,a game model including a government,a retailer and a manufacturer, is set up to study the governments optimal subsidy policy and the enterprises optimal abatement inputs and profits respectively under the conditions of Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium and concentrated decisions in supply chain. Based on this, we discuss the interaction game between government subsidies behavior and enterprises' cooperative behavior to choose abatement. It is shown that the abatement subsidies by government and the profits of enterprises are descent in the order of Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium and concentrated decisions in supply chain. And we compare the differences of government abatement subsidies between enterprise as a leader and as a follower in the unequal power supply chain. By further studying mutual decision between subsidy policy and forms of cooperation, we show that the optmial policy is not to provide subsidy.

Key words: low-carbon supply chain, emission-reducing cooperation, governmental subsidy, game theory

中图分类号:

F224.32

李友东, 赵道致, 夏良杰. 低碳供应链纵向减排合作下的政府补贴策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(4): 1-11.

LI You-dong, ZHAO Dao-zhi, XIA Liang-jie. Governmental Subsidy Policy for Enterprises' Cooperative Behavior in Emission Reduction in Low-carbon Supply Chain[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(4): 1-11.

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