关键词: 公共资产, 部门预算, 信息不对称, 拍卖, 机制设计

Abstract: Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the mechanism design of auction in public asset budgeting. Auction is an effective means of resource allocation and mechanism of price revealed. In this paper, by the use of mechanism design theory and auction theory, we explore a feasible mechanism to improve the allocation efficiency of public asset by the assumption that the government auctions budgetary projects. The auction model we develop is based on the incentive mechanism design approach assuring that the bidders satisfy the conditions of incentive-compatibility constraints and express their true preferences and efficiencies to maximize the utility of government budgetary control. The optimal auction mechanism could be reached when we find the solution of the model. The optimal scoring rules auction is also analyzed considered the complexities of the expression of optimal mechanism. We finally conclude the budgetary rules in practice.

Key words: public asset, department budget, information asymmetry, auction, mechanism design