关键词: 共享平台, 定价, 再制造, 链内交互, 链间竞争

Abstract: Sharing economy has become a hot topic in the field of management science, especially the operation and management of a sharing platform. The resources-sharing platform runs in a leasing mode, in which customers can obtain the usage right of products during a short time by paying a one-time fee if needed. However, waste sharing products have not been effectively dealt with. A typical case is the sharing bike, which not only occupies public space and land resources but also produces solid waste after reaching the three-year scrappage period. Practical and theoretical research show that recycling and remanufacturing can save costs. Consequently, they are widely incorporated into the product “whole life cycle management” process of bike-sharing enterprises.
Unlike the recycling of waste products from customers in the traditional sales mode, sharing products belong to the platform. Therefore, recycling and remanufacturing raise the question of how to reconcile costs and benefits between the manufacturer and platform inside the supply chain. On the one hand, the residual value of scrap products belongs to the platform, so the manufacturer should pay certain subsidies to the platform when recycling products. On the other hand, the manufacturer bears the cost of recycling and dismantling, which releases the environmental protection department of the government of the pressure. The platform should provide subsidies to the manufacturer to encourage recycling and remanufacturing. Comprehensively, the subsidy coordination between two members needs to be verified. Meanwhile, two supply chains consisting of two manufacturers and two platforms will compete with each other.
To investigate the interaction between members inside the supply chain, and figure out the competition between two supply chains, three structures are divided according to whether recycling and remanufacturing are performed. Under the premise of supply chain competition, the pricing of shared products in two supply chains with remanufacturing but without recycling, one with both recycling and remanufacturing, and one in only one supply chain with both recycling and remanufacturing are studied respectively. Both supply chains consist of a manufacturer and a sharing platform, to which the manufacturer sells new and remanufactured products, and the platform provides the use (rental) service for customers. By constructing the model of the intra-chain Stackelberg game and inter-chain Nash non-cooperative game, the optimal wholesale price and lease price are derived under different structures and thus the intra-chain coordination and inter-chain competition mechanism are investigated.
The results show that recycling and remanufacturing are a win-win strategy. Namely, they offer the lowest leased price, so manufacturers and platforms benefit from cost savings. As long as the subsidy given to the platform by the manufacturer does not exceed the positive threshold, the wholesale price will be the lowest when both members recycle and remanufacture, while it will be the highest when both members do not do so. The same conclusion holds for the optimal lease price without any preconditions. Moreover, the structures will spontaneously evolve from no-recycling to both-recycling. The recovery subsidy realizes the profit coordination between the manufacturer and the platform by affecting the wholesale price. Namely, when the subsidy is larger than zero, the unit subsidy given by the manufacturer to the platform will be recovered by raising the wholesale price; and when it is less than zero, unit subsidies given by the platform to manufacturers will be returned in the form of reduced wholesale prices. The saving cost is distributed according to a certain proportion. The fiercer the competition is, the more the platform occupies. And competition coefficient positively influences decision price and optimal return. Furthermore, manufacturers could relinquish part of cost savings to encourage platforms to order more remanufactured products. In addition, the analysis of parameter self-elasticity and competition elasticity shows that the revenue is mainly affected by its own parameters, and the influence of competition parameters is relatively slight.

Key words: sharing platform, pricing, remanufacturing, intra-chain interplay, inter-chains competition