EPR制度下的家电以旧换新回收策略优化模型

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0188

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究生产者责任延伸制度(EPR)约束下,家电生产销售企业集中决策下实施以旧换新进行废旧产品回收的问题。在对家电消费者市场结构进行分析基础上,建立以企业利润最大化为目标的实施以旧换新回收策略的优化模型,并根据我国家电行业EPR制度的特点,构建政府与企业间竞争的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究在政府环境效益最优时的补贴和基金征收标准下,企业以旧换新回收产品最优定价决策;同时,与企业不直接参与废旧产品回收时单一定价相应结果进行比较。结果表明:在EPR约束下,政府环境效益最优时的补贴和基金征收标准,对企业实施以旧换新回收策略的产品销量、总利润和废旧产品回收量的影响取决于企业成本结构、消费者结构、消费者效用和废旧产品回收处理能力。企业决策者需根据不同情形决定是否参与以旧换新回收实践。

关键词: 废旧家电, EPR, 以旧换新, 基金, 补贴

Abstract: The trade-in recycling problem of waste products concentratedly decided by household appliance producers and retailers under the restriction of Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR)Is researched. We conduct trade-in recovery strategy optimization model with the goal of profit maximization based on the analysis of home appliance consumer marker structure, and establish the Stackelberg game models of competition between government and enterprises in accordance with the characteristics of EPR system in China’s home appliance industry, and then study the firm’s old-for-new recovery pricing decisions at the time of optimum environmental benefit of the government subsidies and fund policy; Meanwhile, we compare the corresponding results with common unified-price scheme when the firm does not participate in recycling. The conclusions show that the effect of the optimum environmental benefit of the government subsidies and fund policy under the constraint of the EPR on the trade-in scheme on the sales, profit and recycling quantities depends on the cost structure, the composition of the consumers, the customer preference and its recovery processing capacity. Decision makers of firms should decide whether or not to launch a trade-in campaign in accordance with different scenarios.

Key words: used household appliances, EPR, trade-in, fund, subsidy

中图分类号:

F224.3

李春发, 朱浪梅. EPR制度下的家电以旧换新回收策略优化模型[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(8): 67-75.

LI Chun-fa, ZHU Lang-mei. Optimal Recovery Strategies of Home Appliance Trade-in Scheme under EPR[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(8): 67-75.

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