关键词: 补贴退坡, 双积分政策, 博弈, 汽车供应链

Abstract: Under the policy of regression and Double Integral, we focus on a production decision-making problem for a two-level supply chain composed of an automobile manufacturer and a distributor. Based on Stackelberg game, we analyze the impact of downhill and Double Integral policy on optimal decision-making of automobile manufacturers and distributors. In order to help automobile supply chain in the Double Integral policy, we also compare the supply chain performance in the centralized and decentralized decision-making. The research shows that when the Double Integral policy is not implemented, the demand for new energy vehicles and the profit of manufacturers will decrease with the decrease of subsidies. After the implementation of the Double Integral policy, the demand for new energy vehicles increases by the continuous improvement of R& D efforts of automobile manufacturers, and Pareto Improvement is obtained on the profits of manufacturers and distributors. The numerical analysis shows that the Double Integral policy can effectively promote the development of new energy vehicles.

Key words: subsidy recession, double Integral policy, game, automobile supply chain