关键词: 互惠动机公平偏好, 委托代理, 心理效用函数, 数值模拟

Abstract: This paper attempts to describe the capital allocation decision making behavior and the incentive contracts design theoretically under the conditions of symmetric and asymmetric information, based on the evidence and the characteristics of the reciprocity of individuals. During the theoretical model construction and equilibrium analysis, the results show that managers’ concern over reciprocity can improve their effort level in the implementation of the project, accompanied by the similar effect which explicit incentive contract produces, that is, reciprocity considerations lead to “crowding-in effect”. The results also show that managers would like to report the truthful project quality when they are motivated by reciprocity. It optimizes the capital allocation plan and avoids the moral hazard problems under the condition of asymmetric information specific performance in the setting of sharing coefficient. Namely, the reciprocal motivation produces the role of “signal display mechanism”. Due to the “crowding-in effect”, the critical point of capital allocation to specific project is unlikely to be very low. The seriousness of underinvestment is restrained as well. The research results of this paper provide different contract options for project managers with heterogeneity, and expand the framework of the Principal-Agent Framework Decision under the assumption of “self-interest” to “non self-interest” behavior of agency decisions.

Key words: reciprocity, principal-agent, psychological utility function, numerical simulation